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INTRODUCTION
The terms “cybersquatting,” “ACPA,” “UDRP,” and “reverse
domain name hijacking” are becoming less obscure and esoteric
and are not longer restricted to professional jargon used solely by
Internet and trademark law specialists. In the last few years,
numerous news and magazine articles, as well as professional and
academic publications, introduced the phenomenon of
cybersquatting, described the tools formulated to combat it and
touched upon some problematic aspect in this rapidly developing
field. This Article analyzes one of the most concerning aspects of
U.S. cybersquatting law: foreign actors litigating domain name
disputes in U.S. federal courts. This problem surfaced and
received special attention in the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in
Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona.1
Part I of this Article provides essential background to domain
name dispute issues. Part II describes the legal framework created
to deal with cybersquatting activities, namely the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and the Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy. Part III provides an overview on the
background and facts surrounding the Barcelona.com domain
name dispute and the Fourth Circuit’s ruling. Part IV consists of a
critical analysis of the decision and discussion of its resulting
troublesome consequences. Finally, Part V presents an alternative
to current cybersquatting policy and approaches. In addition, it
provides a new model that highlights the advantages of the
alternative as compared with the shortcomings of the present
approaches.
1

330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003).

EFRONI FORMAT

32

12/9/2003 2:31 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 14:29

I. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
A discussion of the issues raised by international domain name
disputes requires some background knowledge about the Internet
and the law that affects it. Along with a cursory overview on the
Internet and domain name structure, this part includes an
introduction to the relevant jurisdictional issues, a discussion of the
tension between domain name rules and trademark law, and a
survey of the pre-regulation landscape.
A. Internet and Domain Names Architecture
The Internet is a giant “network of networks” facilitating
communication and information transfer between the millions of
computers connected to it.2 The domain name system (“DNS”),
the addressing mechanism of the Internet, is designed in a
hierarchal structure.3 Internet addresses consist of alphanumeric
strings separated by a dot (.), e.g., <news.google.com>, and are
read from left (the lower level of the domain) to right (the higher
level of the domain).4 Theoretically, there is a highest-level
domain at the apex of the domain name space, the “root domain,”
which is usually left unnamed, under which all domains fall.5
Below the root domain are top-level domains (“TLDs”), which
are the highest level of named domains and the part of the address
to the extreme right.6 Top-level domains, in turn, are divided into
two major categories:7 generic top-level domains (“gTLDs”) and
2

For a detailed explanation of the Internet, see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830–
38 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
3
The domain name system (“DNS”) basically correlates the numerical IP addresses
assigned to all computers or “hosts” connected to the Internet (addresses that can be
recognized by computers) and alphabetical strings of characters entered into the search
tool in the user’s browser (addresses that can be more easily remembered by users). For
a description of the DNS, see Orion Armon, Is This as Good as It Gets? An Appraisal of
ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) Three Years After
Implementation, 22 REV. LITIG. 99, 101–03 (2003).
4
See Kim G. von Arx & Gregory R. Hagen, Sovereign Domains: A Declaration of
Independence of ccTLDs from Foreign Control, 9 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, ¶ 11 (2002), at
http://www.law.richmond.edu/jolt/v9i1/article4.html.
5
Id.
6
See id. ¶ 12.
7
A third category of top level domains (“TLDs”) is an infrastructure TLD (“iTLD”)
called <.arpa>, which is used solely for Internet infrastructure purposes. See id. ¶ 12.
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country-code top-level domains (“ccTLDs”).8 Thus, in the domain
name <www.yahoo.com>, the top-level domain is <.com>. The
string of characters <yahoo> is the second-level domain (“SLD”)
registered in the top-level registry <.com> file zone.9
Those TLD servers catalogue domain names registered under
all the ccTLDs and gTLDs.10 The TLD servers communicate with
other servers containing second-level registrations such as
<yahoo>. In fact, there is no single computer containing the entire
database of all domain names, since the TLD servers are located in
“myriad locations worldwide.”11
In the 1980s, seven gTLDs were introduced,12 three of which
could be registered without restrictions (<.com>, <.net>, and
<.org>).13 Later, four additional non-restricted gTLDs were
created (<.biz>, <.info>, <.name>, and <.pro>).14 Presently, six of

8

See Colby B. Springer, Master of the Domain (Name): A History of Domain Name
Litigation and the Emergence of the Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 315,
320–23 (2001) (explaining the TLD structure and registration procedure).
9
Every generic TLD (“gTLD”) has only one registry. A registry is the entity that
stores, manages, and maintains the entire list of second level domains (“SLDs”)
registered under that gTLD. The registry is also responsible for licensing commercial
registrars, which sell available SLDs to consumers. See Cable News Network, LP v.
CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 n.4 (E.D. Va. 2001) [hereinafter CNN I],
vacated in part on other grounds by Cable News Network, LP v. CNNews.com, No. 021112, 2003 WL 152846 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003) [hereinafter CNN Appeal]; see also
Tamar Frankel, The Managing Lawmaker In Cyberspace: A Power Model, 27 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 859, 870–71 (2002) (describing the hierarchal structure of the DNS).
10
Armon, supra note 3, at 102 (describing the hierarchy of the root servers, TLD
servers and sub-level domain directories).
11
See Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace:
Problems with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
989, 1019 (2002).
12
These gTLDs were: <.com>, <.edu>, <.gov>, <.int>, <.mil>, <.net>, and <.org>. See
ICANN, Top-Level Domains, at http://www.icann.org/tlds (last visited Oct. 30, 2003)
[hereinafter Top-Level Domains].
13
Id. Unrestricted gTLDs are ones that are not restricted to certain institutions or
subjects. Examples of restricted gTLDs are <.gov> (restricted to the U.S. government),
<.edu> (restricted to academic institutions), and <.mil> (restricted to the U.S. military).
See Armon, supra note 3, at 103–04.
14
See Top-Level Domains, supra note 12.
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these seven gTLD registries are physically located in U.S.
territory.15
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(“ICANN”), a not-for-profit organization, is responsible for the
maintenance and management of the gTLD directories by virtue of
an exclusive contract with the U.S. government.16
The
administration of the ccTLD registries such as <.ca> for Canada,
<.fr> for France, and <.uk> for the United Kingdom, however, is
“controlled by the corresponding national government[s].”17
B. Introduction to Territorial18 Jurisdictional Issues
In the context of international jurisdictional law, it is useful to
distinguish between three types of jurisdictional powers:
jurisdiction to prescribe (sometimes called legislative
jurisdiction),19 jurisdiction to adjudicate (sometimes called judicial

15

Id. It appears that the <.name> registry, based in London, is the only registry located
outside of the United States. See Global Name Registry, at http://www.nic.name (last
visited Oct. 30, 2003) (official Web site of the <.name> registry).
16
See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 50–93 (2000) (describing the
contractual relationship between the U.S. government and the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) and providing detailed background on the
creation and functions of ICANN); see also Katherine Meyers, Note, Domain Name
Dispute Resolution in U.S. Courts: Should ICANN Be Given Deference?, 43 B.C. L. REV.
1177, 1183–86 (2002) (describing the functions of ICANN).
17
See Lisa M. Sharrock, Note, The Future of Domain Name Dispute Resolution:
Crafting Practical International Legal Solutions from Within the UDRP Framework, 51
DUKE L.J. 817, 840–01 (2001) (noting that unlike domain names with generic TLDs,
administration of each country code TLD (“ccTLD”) is controlled by the corresponding
national government); see also von Arx & Hagen, supra note 4, ¶ 20 (noting that the U.S.
government policy was to give national governments authority to manage or establish
policy for their own ccTLDs).
18
In rem and in personam jurisdictions are sometimes categorized as “territorial
jurisdictions,” as distinguished from subject matter jurisdiction. “For a person or
property to be subject to a particular court’s jurisdiction, there must be a proper
connection between the person or property and the sovereign state in whose name the
court acts.” FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. FleetBostonFinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121,
129 (D. Mass. 2001) (citing 16 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 108.01 (Matthew Bender
3d ed.)). The terms personal jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction are used
interchangeably this Article.
19
Jurisdiction to prescribe is a state’s authority to make its laws applicable to the
“activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things . . . .”
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jurisdiction),20 and jurisdiction to enforce (sometimes called
executive jurisdiction).21 The power and authority of a state to
legislate, adjudicate, and enforce its national law in the
international sphere are traditionally subject to constraints of
territoriality, nationality, and effect.22 Thus, every state has the
obligation to exercise moderation and restraint in invoking
jurisdiction over cases involving foreign elements.23 The Internet,
providing a global and border-free platform for communication,
information, and various commercial activities, challenges
traditional concepts of jurisdiction.
1. In Personam Jurisdiction24
Since in personam jurisdiction determines when a defendant is
subject to adjudicative process of the court, it is closely related to
the judicial jurisdiction concept and its general limitations. The
rule in any inquiry into whether a state can subject a person or a
thing25 to the process of its courts is the rule of “reasonableness.”26
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a)
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW].
20
Jurisdiction to adjudicate is a state’s authority “to subject persons or things to the
process of its courts or administrative tribunals . . . .” Id. § 401(b).
21
Jurisdiction to enforce is a state’s authority “to induce or compel compliance or to
punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations . . . .” Id. § 401(c).
22
Id. § 401 cmt. a (noting that a state’s different jurisdictional powers each have
different limitations under international law); see also Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller,
International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50
FED. COMM. L.J. 117 (Dec. 1997) (describing the application of international law
principles on jurisdictional concepts), available at http://www.law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v50/no1/wilske.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
23
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Calif., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (“‘Great
care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction
into the international field.’” (quoting United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S.
378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
24
This overview of in personam jurisdiction is based on material in a previous article
by this author. See Zohar Efroni, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and
the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy: New Opportunities for International Forum
Shopping?, 26 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 335, 339–41 (2003).
25
This rule is also relevant to in rem jurisdiction. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing
principles of in rem jurisdiction).
26
“A state may exercise jurisdiction through its courts to adjudicate with respect to a
person or thing if the relationship of the state to the person or thing is such as to make the
exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.” RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra
note 19, § 421(1).
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U.S. courts,27 considering whether to assert personal jurisdiction,
generally look at two elements: the long-arm statute in the
jurisdiction at issue and the due process requirement of the U.S.
Constitution.28 Personal jurisdiction may be divided into two
types: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. General
jurisdiction is applicable when the defendant has engaged in
“‘systematic and continuous activities’ in the forum state.”29 In
this instance, the plaintiff does not have to show a connection
between the forum-related activities of the foreign party and the
cause of action.
In the context of jurisdiction arising out of online activity, the
systematic and continuous contacts are often absent. Specific
jurisdiction, however, which does not require systematic and
continuous contacts, may apply if the cause of action is related to
the foreign party’s activity in the forum state. The power to assert
personal jurisdiction, however, was discussed in Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California.30 Justice O’Connor’s
plurality opinion in the Asahi case stated that a court could subject
a corporation to suit in a state only if the defendant took an action
“purposefully directed” toward the forum state.31 The mere
placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more,
is not such an act; the defendant must take additional action to
indicate the “intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum
state”—advertising, for example.32

27

Most of the cases described in this subsection decided domestic U.S. disputes, in
which the question was which U.S. state had personal jurisdiction over a defendant. U.S.
personal jurisdiction concepts, however, are also applicable to international disputes.
28
See Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Calif., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) (stating that personal
jurisdiction depends upon the presence of reasonable notice to the defendant that an
action has been brought and a sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum
state to make it fair to require defense of the action in the forum).
29
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–16
(1984)).
30
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
31
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
32
Id. The Supreme Court, however, has not yet resolved this issue. See id. at 116–21
(Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing against the “purposeful availment” requirement).
Thus, in the Internet context, the applicable threshold for on-line activity that establishes
personal jurisdiction was not definitively determined in the Asahi decision.
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Generally, courts apply a three-prong test for asserting specific
jurisdiction. The plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant
purposefully availed himself or herself of the privileges and
liabilities of the jurisdictions by conducting activities specific to
the jurisdiction,33 which is a version of the traditional “minimum
contacts” test;34 (2) the cause of action arises from those
activities;35 and (3) the assertion of jurisdiction is reasonable in the
circumstances.36
The first prong of this test is the hardest to clarify in the
context of online activities. Courts were generally reluctant to
extend personal jurisdiction merely because the defendant operated
a Web site that was accessible from the forum state. In this
context, courts tended to follow Justice O’Connor’s opinion in
Asahi.37 Consequently, a sliding scale was developed, providing
that the more commercially oriented the Web site is and the more it
is engaged in direct commercial activities targeting the forum state,
the more the defendant is susceptible to the forum state’s
jurisdiction.38 The two ends of the sliding scale proved relatively
easy to identify. On one end, a purely passive Web site generally
would not establish personal jurisdiction.39 If a defendant was
“doing business” through the Web site with individuals in the
33

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The test was later articulated in
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
34
The “minimum contacts” test was first established in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
35
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
36
See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing
Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995)). The role of the reasonableness as
a balancing factor is explained in Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
37
See, e.g., Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418; Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp.
295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
38
See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (“[O]ur review of the available cases and materials reveals that the likelihood that
personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the
nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. This
sliding scale is consistent with well developed personal jurisdiction principles.” (footnote
omitted)).
39
A typical example was Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), in which the Web site contained only general informative text about the
Blue Note club in Missouri, and the famous Blue Note jazz club in New York claimed
infringement.
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forum state, however, courts were generally willing to assert
jurisdiction.40 The difficult cases lay in the middle, cases in which
the Web site was interactive but still did not amount to clearly
doing business with the forum state. Some courts demanded a
certain threshold of interactivity and “something more” than mere
advertising in order to establish jurisdiction.41 Other courts
considered whether to extend their jurisdictional reach based on
the totality of contacts of defendant with the forum state, with and
without regard to the Internet activities.42
Recently, courts have started using an additional tool to expand
personal jurisdiction in Internet-related activities known as the
“effects doctrine.” The three basic components of the doctrine,
which grants the forum state jurisdiction over a foreign actor, are:
(1) an intentional action, (2) which is expressly aimed toward the
forum-state’s jurisdiction, (3) causing harm that occurred in that
jurisdiction when that actor knew it might occur.43 Examples of
applying this test to online activities can be found mostly in
Internet-based defamation cases44 and in cases decided before the
ACPA’s enactment,45 in which proving “purposeful availment” by
the defendant was problematic.
Undoubtedly, the increase in activities—commercial and
otherwise—on the Internet introduced new and difficult questions
40

See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265–66 (6th Cir. 1996)
(asserting jurisdiction on a Texas defendant, whose contacts with the forum state
consisted almost exclusively of selling software through computer transmissions to
CompuServe’s system in Ohio).
41
See, e.g., Millennium Enters. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 920–23
(D. Or. 1999) (introducing the requirement of a “deliberate action” in the forum state).
42
See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 56–57 (D.D.C. 1998).
43
See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984) (establishing an “effects” test for
intentional action aimed at the forum state).
44
See, e.g., Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999). In Bochan, a
Virginia resident brought an Internet defamation lawsuit in the Eastern District of
Virginia against residents of Texas and Missouri. Id. at 694–95. Denying the defendants’
jurisdictional challenge to the court’s jurisdiction, the court stated that “because the
predominant ‘effects’ of the La Fontaines’ and Harris’s conduct are in Virginia, these
defendants could reasonably foresee being haled into court in this jurisdiction.” Id. at 702
(quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90).
45
See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the
“effects doctrine” in a classic pre-Anticybersqatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”)
cybersquatting case).
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for U.S. courts deciding personal jurisdiction issues. The tests
applied and the results that followed differed from case to case
depending, inter alia, on the specific long-arm statute involved and
each court’s interpretation of the concepts of “purposeful
availment” and “interactive online activity” sufficient for
exercising personal jurisdiction.46 For purposes of this Article,
however, it is important to be aware of the new problems
encountered by plaintiffs attempting to hail into court cyberdefendants and the potential expansion of personal jurisdiction
when the allegedly unlawful act occurred “everywhere and
nowhere at the same time.”47
2. In Rem Jurisdiction
In rem jurisdiction facilitates legal action against the thing (or
the res) itself,48 with legal actions commenced in the judicial situs
where the thing is located.49 Hence, the application of the rule of
“reasonableness” in this context requires the res to be located in
the territorial jurisdiction of the court and to have some relevancy
to the dispute.50 The three types51 of in rem jurisdictions are: (1)
46

As of today, there is no ruling by the Supreme Court that resolves the different
approaches of several circuits regarding certain questions of personal jurisdiction. See
Springer, supra note 8, at 334.
47
See Ira S. Nathenson, Comment, Showdown at the Domain Name Corral: Property
Rights and Personal Jurisdiction over Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites, 58 U.
PITT. L. REV. 911, 935–46 (1997) (describing the difficulties of asserting jurisdiction in
Internet-related activities).
48
In rem is defined as “in or against the thing.” BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN LEGAL USAGE 453 (2d ed. 1990).
49
“In rem jurisdiction is predicated on the notion that the res is found within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.” FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. FleetBostonFinancial.com,
138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 135 (D. Mass. 2001).
50
One court explained:
In order for a court to act with authority to hear a dispute and render a judgment
that will justify recognition, the court must have jurisdiction not only over the
subject matter of the suit, but also over the person or property to whom or
which the court’s judgment will extend . . . . For a person or property to be
amenable to a particular court’s jurisdiction, there must be a proper connection
between the person or property and the sovereign in whose name the court acts.
Id. at 129 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
51
Id. at 132 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958) (noting the three
types of in rem jurisdiction)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 222 topic 2 (1971).
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true in rem, which arises when courts adjudicate property rights
over the thing vis-à-vis the world;52 (2) quasi in rem I, in which
property rights are allocated as against particular named persons;53
and (3) quasi in rem II, which concerns the rights of a particular
person or persons in a thing, but is distinguishable from quasi in
rem I because the claim giving rise to the action “is not related to
the res that provides jurisdiction.”54
In making these distinctions, a continuing source of
controversy is the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Shaffer v.
Heitner.55 The Shaffer court held that the mere statutory presence
of a defendant’s property in a state—without any other ties among
the defendant, the state, and the litigation—could not support
jurisdiction over the defendants in that state.56 Some courts
believe that Shaffer requires minimum contacts analysis in
exercising any type of in rem jurisdiction,57 while other courts
interpreted Shaffer as compelling such a test only in quasi in rem II
cases.58
This somewhat obscure issue regained new, fascinating life in
the context of domain names. In rem jurisdiction could be an
effective response to evasive cybersquatters avoiding personal
jurisdiction, but the prospect of invoking in rem jurisdiction raises
some difficult questions. For instance, do domain names constitute
52

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 246 n.12.
See Fleetboston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 132. Examples include actions to remove a
cloud on title to land or actions seeking to quiet title against a particular rival’s claim. Id.
54
Id. In a quasi in rem II action, “the plaintiff does not dispute the property rights of
the owner of the res, but seeks to obtain the res in satisfaction of some separate claim.”
Id.
55
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
56
See id. at 209.
57
For instance, the district court in Fleetboston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 134, found that the
Shaffer holding is not limited to quasi in rem type II actions:
The logic of Shaffer’s limitations would appear to extend to actions in which
the existence of the property in the state cannot fairly be said to represent
meaningful contacts between the forum state, the defendant, and the litigation.
While this will generally be type II quasi in rem actions, it will not be so
exclusively.
Id.
58
See, e.g., CNN I, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 489–92 (E.D. Va. 2001) (adopting a limited
reading of Shaffer and citing many other authorities supporting this interpretation), aff’d
in relevant part by CNN Appeal, No. 02-1112, 2003 WL 152846 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003).
53
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the necessary res to qualify for in rem jurisdiction? If yes, in
which territory do they “exist”? Also, are minimum contacts with
the forum required for exercising such jurisdiction?59
C. The Intersection of Trademark Law and Domain Name
Disputes60
The friction between trademark law and domain names is a
well-acknowledged problem and an inevitable outgrowth of the
Internet and particularly of online commercial activities. The clash
mainly arises because traditional trademark law was not designed
and did not contemplate, ab initio, trademark disputes occurring
purely in a global, electronic medium such as the Internet. In
particular, the uniqueness and global reach of domain names serve
to complicate the application of traditional trademark concepts.
1. The Basic Tension
When the use of marks incorporated in domain names
increased through the 1990s as a tool of mark owners to promote
their commercial activities, the basic tension between trademark
law and domain names surfaced and intensified. There are two
parts to this problem. First, there is similarity between marks and
domain names as potential identifiers with the capacity to
distinguish between sources of goods and services. Second, the
nature and purpose of trademarks and domain names is
conceptually different. As a branch of commercial competition
law, trademark protection—at least under U.S. law—is primarily
designed to facilitate distinctions between sources of goods or
services in order to prevent confusion among consumers and to
protect the goodwill of the mark.61 Conversely, the domain name
59

See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
The discussion about the conflict between trademark and domain name concepts is
based on material included in a previous article by the author. See Efroni, supra note 24,
at 342–46.
61
See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Two
goals of trademark law are reflected in the federal scheme. On the one hand, the law
seeks to protect consumers who have formed particular associations with a mark. On the
other hand, trademark law seeks to protect the investment in a mark made by the owner.”
(citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995))); see also 74
AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 1 (2001) (“The purpose of trademark law is
60

EFRONI FORMAT

42

12/9/2003 2:31 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 14:29

system was merely meant to coordinate easy-to-remember strings
of letters and hard-to-memorize strings of numbers. Domain
names were not meant to function as trademarks; they were
thought to be simply a feature in the system of addresses
corresponding with “locations” in cyberspace.62
Trademark law, however, is designed both to protect the
goodwill of the mark and to prevent consumer confusion.63
Therefore, identical or similar marks may generally coexist for
different classes of goods and services under the assumption that
there is no danger of confusion.64 Moreover, because trademark
law is territorial,65 the mark may be protected only in the sovereign
giving effect to the mark, generally after determination that the
mark qualifies as an identifier of goods and/or services within the
territory of that sovereign.66 Thus, trademark law can conceptually
tolerate identical or similar marks in different territories within the
same classes of goods and services, typically according to separate

to protect the public from confusion regarding the sources of goods or services and to
protect business from the diversion of trade through the misrepresentation or
appropriation of another’s goodwill.” (citing Minneapple Co. v. Normandin, 338 N.W.2d
18, 22 (Minn. 1983))).
62
See Assafa Endeshaw, The Threat of Domain Names to the Trademark System, 3 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 323, 323 (2000) (“The initial purpose of domain names was to
assign a unique address to a computer connected to a network.”).
63
See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)
(outlining a series of nonexclusive factors likely to be relevant in determining the
likelihood of confusion).
64
A major exception is famous marks. The Lanham Act protects famous marks against
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). Dilution
is defined as “lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of . . . [the] likelihood of
confusion, mistake or deception.” Id. § 1127.
65
See, e.g., Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The
concept of territoriality is basic to trademark law; trademark rights exist in each country
solely according to that country’s statutory scheme.”) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
66
See Endeshaw, supra note 62, at 324 (explaining that marks normally can have legal
effect only in the specific territory where they are registered, or, in cases of nonregistered marks, where they established themselves). Some famous marks, however, are
protected beyond strictly defined territory. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:4 (2003) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS].
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legal schemes giving effect to such marks.67 Domain names, by
contrast, are both unique and global in nature. Only one entity in
the world can obtain the right to use a specific domain name, and
that domain name that can be accessed globally.68
2. The Prehistory of Cybersquatting Regulation
When mark owners started to realize the commercial power
and value of incorporating their marks in domain names, it was
sometimes too late. The domain name registration system was not
interested in trademark rights and supplied registrations to whoever
was willing to pay the appropriate fee on a “first come, first
served” basis.69 Some of the “early bird” registrants did not have
any rights to the marks. When this led to wholesale registrations
of domain names by registrants who held the domain names “for
ransom,”70 mark owners decided to fight back against these
cybersquatting activities.71 Early on, the most effective tools in the
U.S. legal system to combat cybersquatting were traditional
trademark and unfair competition law and the relatively new

67

The territoriality doctrine, however, under which a trademark is recognized as having
a separate existence in each sovereign territory in which it is registered or legally
recognized, has been criticized as “obsolete in a world market where information
products like computer programs cannot be located at a particular spot on the globe.”
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 66, § 29:1, at 29-4 to -6.
68
Technically, it is more accurate to say that only one registrant may have exclusive
rights in a certain SLD (such as <yahoo>) under a certain TLD (such as <.com>). See,
e.g., Frankel, supra note 9, at 870–72 (noting the uniqueness of a domain name and
describing the significance of that uniqueness).
69
See A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy”—Causes
and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 620 (2002) (noting that “registration of
SLDs in the three existing gTLDs (.com, .org, and .net) and in the ccTLDs which emulate
them, is on a first-come, first-served basis”).
70
One court described cybersquatting as “the registration as domain names of wellknown trademarks by non-trademark holders who then try to sell the names back to the
trademark owners . . . who not infrequently have been willing to pay ‘ransom’ in order to
get ‘their names’ back.” See Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d
489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5–7 (1999) and S. REP. NO.
106-140, at 4–7 (1999)).
71
Generally, cybersquatting is referred to as the unlawful registration of domain names
incorporating trademarks in which others have rights. One Senate report defined
cybersquatting as “the deliberate, bad-faith, and abusive registration of Internet domain
names in violation of the rights of trademark owners.” S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
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Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”),72 the latter of which
was incorporated into the U.S. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham
Act”).73
Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act74 protects registered mark
owners against the use of their trademarks in cases of likelihood of
confusion as to the source of the goods and services. This
protection was sometimes hard to implement in cases of
cybersquatting because many cybersquatters never tried to confuse
consumers as to the source of any goods or services. Often, the
cybersquatter never posted anything on the Web site because the
intention was eventually to sell the domain name for profit to the
mark holder.75 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act76 protects mark
owners—including
non-registered
marks—against
false
advertising and confusion as to the source, sponsorship, and
affiliation of goods and services. In both cases, the hallmarks of
trademark protection are in the concepts of “likelihood of
confusion”77 and “use in commerce.”78

72

Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)).
73
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2000).
74
Id. § 1114(1).
75
See J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks, Cybersquatters and Domain Names, 10
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 231, 245 (2000) (“The usual cybersquatter has
no interest in using the domain name to identify a website. The cybersquatter typically
wants only to warehouse the name and deprive the legitimate owner of its use, releasing it
only for a fee.”).
76
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
77
See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (stating
that trademark law protects consumers from a likelihood of confusion as to the source of
products, and also assures that mark owners will reap the financial benefits of products
bearing their marks); Anahid Chalikian, Comment, Cybersquatting, 3 J. LEGAL ADVOC. &
PRAC. 106, 107 (2001) (stating that the hallmark of any trademark infringement or false
advertising claim is the likelihood of confusion).
78
For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) indicates that only trademarks “used in
commerce” can register in the U.S. principal register. In an Intent to Use (“ITU”)
application for registration in the principal registrar, the applicant must give a formal
statement of his or her “bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.” Id. §
1051(b)(3)(B). In addition, an ITU applicant must supply a “verified statement that the
mark is in use in commerce” within six months after the date of the notice of allowance.
Id. § 1051(d)(1). Use in commerce by the defendant is also a prerequisite for filing a
civil action against unlawful competing use under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
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Because of the complications in applying traditional trademark
concepts to prevent cybersquatting, the more popular tool was the
FTDA, which provides injunctive relief to owners of famous marks
against dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.79 Dilution
may occur either as a result of “blurring” or “tarnishment” of the
famous mark.80 The benefit for mark owners under the FTDA was
that they did not have to prove likelihood of consumer confusion in
dilution claims.81 Nevertheless, the use in commerce requirement
remains intact.82
In applying traditional trademark law tests or trademark
dilution principles in cybersquatting cases, the first question is
whether incorporation of the mark in a domain name constituted
unlawful trademark infringement or dilution.83 In analyzing this
issue, courts tried to incorporate trademark and dilution concepts
into domain name disputes, recognizing the dual purpose of
79

Id. § 1125(c); see also Jason R. Edgecombe, Comment, Off The Mark: Bringing the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act in Line with Established Trademark Law, 51 EMORY
L.J. 1247 (2002) (providing an overview of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(“FTDA”)).
80
Edgecombe, supra note 79, at 1253–56 (describing these two traditional forms of
dilution). The concept of cybersquatting causing dilution was applied in Intermatic Inc.
v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239–41 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
81
See supra text accompanying notes 63–64. Indeed, one of the explicit goals of the
FTDA was to help fight cybersquatters. As Senator Leahy of Vermont stated, “it is my
hope that this antidilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses
taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated with the products and
reputations of others.” 141 CONG. REC. 38,561 (1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
82
The statute reads:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled . . . to an injunction against
another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in
this subsection.
15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added).
83
Professor McCarthy, the trademark scholar, observes that “[t]he relationship between
domain names and trademark law falls into two parts: validity and infringement.”
McCarthy, supra note 75, at 241. The validity question is whether a domain name is, or
can become, a trade or service mark, and McCarthy confidently answers in the
affirmative. See id. at 241–42. As to whether a domain name can infringe someone else’s
valid trademark or service mark, however, McCarthy finds the issue more complex. See
id. at 242–43; see also Sharrock, supra note 17, at 840 n.131 (suggesting that TLDs such
as <.com> or <.net> are not individually capable of serving as trademarks, since they are
not capable of being source identifiers).
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domain names in the contemporary world of commerce. As one
commentator observed:
The domain name serves a dual purpose. It marks the
location of the site within cyberspace, much like a postal
address in the real world, but it may also indicate to users
some information as to the content of the site, and, in
instances of well-known trade names or trademarks, may
provide information as to the origin of the contents of the
site.84
Courts have recognized that potential customers of well-known
mark holders will be discouraged if they cannot find that
company’s mark at its most obvious location, “but instead are
forced to wade through hundreds of web sites.”85 Addressing the
problem in Panavision International L.P. v. Toeppen, the Ninth
Circuit observed that “[a] significant purpose of the domain name
is to identify the entity that owns the web site.”86 Affirming an
FTDA ruling against a cybersquatting defendant, the court found
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark in its domain name
“diminished ‘the capacity of the [plaintiff’s] marks to identify and
distinguish [its] goods and services on the Internet.’”87
The second problem was the commercial use requirement. In
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, the Ninth Circuit held that the
mere registration of a domain name is not, in and of itself, a
“commercial use” for the purposes of dilution.88 In the Panavision
case, however, the cybersquatter only used the allegedly diluting
domain name to post on his Web site views of the landscape of
84

Peter Brown, New Issues in Internet Litigation, in 17TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
COMPUTER LAW: THE EVOLVING LAW OF THE INTERNET-COMMERCE, FREE SPEECH,
SECURITY, OBSENITY AND ENTERTAINMENT, at 151, 156 (PLI Pats., Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 471, 1997), quoted in
Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998).
85
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1326 (quoting 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (district court
opinion)). This kind of dilution developed by the court was sometimes called “dilution
by elimination.” See Ronald Abramson, Internet Domain Litigation, 1999, in ADVANCED
SEMINAR ON TRADEMARK LAW, at 7, 20–21 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 558, 1999).
88
189 F.3d 868, 879–80 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Pana, Illinois, but the court nevertheless found a commercial use
because the cybersquatter tried to profit by the resale of the domain
name to the entity conducting business under it.89 In other words,
the court concluded that a cybersquatter might be subject to
injunction under the FTDA even if its only business is to trade
domain names with the corresponding mark owners for
commercial gain.
U.S. courts have stretched trademark law, and especially the
FTDA, “like a rubber band” to strike down cybersquatters.90 Thus,
even before the enactment of the ACPA, cybersquatters were, in
many cases, successfully defeated in courts. Some problems
remained unsolved, however, such as cybersquatting activities that
did not fall within the protection against dilution by blurring or
tarnishing a famous mark.91 In addition, the FTDA protects only
famous marks; non-famous marks are left outside of its scope.92
At that time, it was clear that some troubling questions remained
unsolved, for example when registrants sought to profit from the
“non-mark” value of the domain name, such as in the case of
surnames.93 Finally, the problem of commercial use was not
entirely solved by the case law. For example, existing law left a
gap for sophisticated cybersquatters who did not show any attempt
to sell the domain name to the mark owners, but also made no
89

See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp.
1227, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 1996)).
90
McCarthy, supra note 75, at 247.
91
Even given the judicial activist approach that courts were willing to take against
cybersquatters, it remained uncertain how much further courts should go while facing
more and more sophisticated activities. See generally id. at 245–49.
92
At that time, some commentators expressed the concern that courts will artificially
extend beyond recognition the concept and interpretation of “famousness” out of their
desire to help mark owners in their war against cybersquatting. See, e.g., Michael B.
Landau, Problems Arising Out of the Use of “WWW.TRADEMARK.COM”: The
Application of Principles of Trademark Law to Internet Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 455, 478–80 (1997). One commentator suggested that the district court’s
expansion of the commercial use requirement in Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp.
1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996), “went beyond even the most elastic interpretation of the class of
goods that the mark will have been registered for . . . and the broadest allowance for the
plausible boundary of the specific (famous) mark.” Endeshaw, supra note 62, at 337.
93
See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 879–81 (9th Cir. 1999)
(indicating that the Ninth Circuit did not consider as typical cybersquatting the wholesale
trade in domain names ending in <.net>, offered for sale for their non-trademark value).
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other commercial use of it. Given the trouble and expenses
involving long, expensive, and complex litigation against the
cybersquatters, some mark owners simply preferred to pay off the
ransom.94 Professor J. Thomas McCarthy argued that even with
the FTDA, “there was a poor fit between the actions of the typical
cybersquatter and the federal trademark law as it existed” before
the enactment of the ACPA.95
II. THE NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK
After reviewing the problematic juncture of trademarks and
domain names, it is evident why change was imperative.96 In late
1999, intense pressure from the trademark owner community led to
the creation of two important mechanisms designed to address
domain name disputes and thwart cybersquatting:97 the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) and the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”). This part provides
an overview on these two important developments and notes some
of the relevant court decisions interpreting them.
A. The UDRP
1. The UDRP Mechanism in Brief
The UDRP98 is incorporated by reference into all ICANNcontrolled registration agreements of generic top-level domains

94
See, Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir.
2000) (indicating that the speculative registration of domain names “prevents use of the
domain name by the mark owners, who not infrequently have been willing to pay
‘ransom’ in order to get ‘their names’ back” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5–7
(1999); S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4–7 (1999))).
95
McCarthy, supra note 75, at 245.
96
Congress decided that legislation was “needed to clarify the rights of trademark
owners with respect to bad faith, abusive domain name registration practices, to provide
clear deterrence to prevent bad faith and abusive conduct, and to provide adequate
remedies for trademark owners in those cases where it does occur.” S. REP. NO. 106-140,
at 7–8 (1999).
97
See supra note 70 (defining cybersquatting).
98
ICANN, UNIFORM DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (1999), at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter UDRP or POLICY].
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such as <.com>, <.net>, and <.org>.99 The UDRP controls the
rights and obligations of the domain name registrant vis-à-vis the
registrar in cases of a third party’s claims regarding the
registration.100 The UDRP is sometimes called a mandatory or
administrative arbitration mechanism, since it created a
compulsory tribunal to adjudicate cybersquatting claims.101 What
makes the UDRP so powerful and unavoidable is that, by virtue of
an exclusive agreement with the U.S. Department of Commerce,
ICANN is the only entity responsible for the administration of the
domain name system.102 ICANN’s contracts with the gTLD
registries compel the incorporation of the UDRP in all contracts
between these gTLD registries and commercial registrars, who, in
turn, incorporate the UDRP in all registration agreements with
gTLD registrants.103 Hence, since 1999 all ICANN-controlled
gTLD registrants must adhere to the UDRP.104

99

See Froomkin, supra note 69, at 716 (explaining that ICANN requires all registrants
in gTLDs such as <.com> to agree to a mandatory online dispute resolution process).
100
The Policy provides:
This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy . . . has been adopted
by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers . . . is
incorporated by reference into your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the
terms and conditions in connection with a dispute between you and any party
other than us (the registrar) over the registration and use of an Internet domain
name registered by you.
UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 1.
101
A more accurate description of the UDRP, however, portrayed it as “a hybrid
decision-making structure that draws on elements found in arbitration, adjudication, and
ministerial decision-making systems.” Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141, 154 (2001).
102
See Michael Geist, FAIR.COM?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systematic
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 903, 913–21 (2002) (chronicling
the developments leading to ICANN’s creation and noting that “the U.S. government
approved the creation of ICANN, granting the new non-profit corporation the
responsibility for centralizing the management of the DNS”).
103
See Keith Blackman, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy: A
Cheaper Way to Hijack Domain Names and Suppress Critics, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
211, 228 (2001) (noting that the UDRP and its accompanying rules are incorporated by
reference into all registration agreements with approved registrars).
104
For a timeline of the implementation of the Policy, see ICANN, Timeline for the
Formulation and Implementation of the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
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The UDRP consists of a policy105 as well as rules.106 It was
crafted to interfere only with blunt and straightforward cases of
infringing registrations.107 In such a typical case, the registrant,
having no rights in a mark, takes advantage of the fact that domain
names are assigned on a first come, first served basis and registers
an attractive domain name—or often, many domain names—
incorporating an established mark.108 Under the UDRP, a
complainant must prove three elements: (1) the domain name is
identical or confusingly similar to a mark in which the complainant
has rights; (2) the registrant has no legitimate interests in respect of
the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered
and is being used in bad faith.109 Once these three elements are
satisfied, the UDRP panel is entitled to order the cancellation of
the domain name or its transfer to the complainant.110 The UDRP
also supplies a non-exclusive list of circumstances indicating
registration and use in bad faith,111 and a non-exclusive list of
105

See supra note 98.
See ICANN, RULES FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY
(1999), at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003)
[hereinafter UDRP RULES].
107
See David E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name Disputes Decisions,
18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 46 (2001) (noting that the UDRP, at
least theoretically, is intended to cover only a narrow range of domain name disputes);
Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 101, at 183–84 (describing the reaffirmation of a
narrow-in-scope UDRP concept and citing relevant parts of ICANN’s Second Staff
Report, which significantly shaped the Policy in its final version).
108
See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998);
Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
109
See UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 4(a).
110
See id. ¶ 3.
111
See id. ¶ 4(b). Under the UDRP, the following circumstances, “in particular but
without limitation,” demonstrate the bad-faith registration and use of a domain name:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the
domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise
transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner
of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for
valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs
directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the
trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain
name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of
disrupting the business of a competitor; or
106
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affirmative defenses showing legitimate interests in the domain
name.112
The UDRP has been a very popular tool for mark owners
seeking recourse against possible cybersquatters.113 One of the
major reasons for the UDRP’s popularity among mark owners is its
fast, streamlined, and effective process.114 Since the UDRP draws
its power from the registration agreement that uniformly
incorporates this mechanism, it is not limited by geographical
boundaries. As noted, the UDRP was explicitly not meant to bind
a court deciding on the same dispute. Before, after, and in the
course of the UDRP process, registrants are entitled to commence
a legal action in court,115 and the court’s decision, once rendered, is

(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for
commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by
creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a
product or service on your web site or location.
Id.
112

See id. ¶ 4(c). Under the UDRP, the following circumstances, “in particular but
without limitation,” indicate rights and legitimate interests in a domain name:
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable
preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain
name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been commonly
known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no trademark or service
mark rights; or
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain
name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or
to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Id.
113
According to ICANN’s Web site, as of September 10, 2003, more than 8,500
proceedings were filed to UDRP panels, concerning more than 14,500 domain names.
See ICANN, Summary of Status of Proceedings, at http://www.icann.org-/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last updated Sept. 10, 2003).
114
See, e.g., UDRP RULES, supra note 106, ¶ 5(a) (registrant must file a response to the
complaint within 20 days of the “day of commencement”); id. ¶ 6 (a panel is generally
appointed within five days of the filing of the response); id. ¶ 15(b) (decision should be
rendered by the panel, absent of exceptional circumstances, within fourteen days of it
appointment).
115
See, e.g., BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 508–09
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that a plaintiff that has filed an ICANN administrative
proceeding may bring action in federal court before, during, and after filing the ICANN
proceeding).
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decisive with respect to the rights in the domain name.116
Additionally, if a losing registrant in the UDRP proceeding, whose
domain name has been ordered cancelled or transferred, files a
complaint in a court of mutual jurisdiction117 within ten business
days from the panel’s decision, execution of the panel’s ruling has
an automatic stay until the court decides on the matter or until the
dispute is otherwise resolved.118
2. The Mutual Jurisdiction Problem and Rule 3(b)(xiii)
At this point, it is important to highlight an often-overlooked
aspect of the UDRP rules. Rule 3(b)(xiii) provides that a
trademark owner wishing to file a complaint against a registrant,
must, as part of the procedural act of filing the complaint to the
panel, submit to the jurisdiction of the courts in at least one
specified “mutual jurisdiction.”119 This provision is relevant in
those cases where the mark owner wins the UDRP proceeding and
the registrant subsequently wants to challenge the panel’s decision
in court.120 Mutual jurisdiction is defined in the rules as:
[A] court jurisdiction at the location of either (a) the
principal office of the Registrar . . . or (b) the domain-name
holder’s address as shown for the registration of the domain
name in Registrar’s Whois database at the time the
complaint is submitted to the Provider.121
Reading this definition, it becomes apparent that the registrant
has complete control over the determination of which court would
be a mutual jurisdiction court.122 Obviously, the registrant can
decide with which registrar to register the domain name and may
make that choice based on which registrar has its principal office
116

See id.; see also UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 4(k).
See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining the concept of mutual jurisdiction).
118
See UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 4(k).
119
See UDRP RULES, supra note 106, ¶ 3(b)(xiii).
120
See Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 101, at 186 (describing the process of
approving the concept of mutual jurisdiction in the final version of the UDRP).
121
See UDRP RULES, supra note 106, ¶ 1; see also infra note 124 (defining a “Whois”
directory). “Registrar” is defined in the rules as “the entity with which the Respondent
[i.e., registrant] has registered a domain name that is the subject of a complaint.” UDRP
RULES, supra note 106, ¶ 1.
122
See Efroni, supra note 24, at 350 n.101.
117
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in a preferred jurisdiction.123 In addition, the registrant clearly
decides which address to provide to the registrar, an address that
ultimately appears in the registrar’s Whois database.124
Furthermore, a sophisticated registrant could merge the two
options of mutual jurisdiction into one.125 This aspect of the
UDRP is important in cases when personal jurisdiction over the
(potential) mark owner is questionable in a particular court, but the
cybersquatter wants, nevertheless, to secure litigation in that
favored jurisdiction.126
B. The ACPA
The second mechanism controlling cybersquatting disputes is
the ACPA.127 Congress was convinced that the uncertainty as to
the application of trademark law, inconsistent judicial decisions,
and the growing phenomenon of cybersquatting needed to be
remedied.128 The result was the ACPA, a statute enacted in
1999129 and incorporated into the Lanham Act. The ACPA
includes two types of actions affording mark owners recourse in
cybersquatting cases: in personam actions130 and in rem actions.131
123

Today, there are more than 170 registrars worldwide accredited by ICANN to sell
domain names to consumers. See ICANN, ICANN-Accredited Registrars, at
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html (last updated Oct. 28, 2003).
124
A “Whois” directory is the list of registrants and their details run by the registration
authority. See Cable News Networks v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 514 n.14
(E.D. Va. 2001) [hereinafter CNN II], vacated in part on other grounds by CNN Appeal,
No. 02-1112, 2003 WL 152846; see also Network Solutions, Whois Search, at
http://www.networksolutions.com/en_US/whois/index.jhtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
125
For example, a hypothetical registrant may wish to register a <.com> domain name
and also make sure that in case he or she loses in the UDRP, any subsequent litigation
regarding this registration shall take place in the state of Virginia. All that the registrant
needs to do is to choose a Virginia-based registrar and supply to that registrar a Virginia
address to appear in the Whois database.
126
See discussion infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing possible litigation strategies of
registrants).
127
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116, 1117, 1125, 1129 (2000).
128
See Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495–96 (2d Cir.
2000) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 6 (1999) and S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (1999)).
129
See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of the Intellectual Property and
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501
(1999).
130
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1).
131
See id. § 1125(d)(2).

EFRONI FORMAT

54

12/9/2003 2:31 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 14:29

Another important section is the reverse domain name hijacking
(“RDNH”) provision, designed to grant protection to registrants
against unjustified cybersquatting claims.132
1. In Personam Action
In an in personam action under the ACPA, the mark owner
must first be able to establish in personam jurisdiction over the
registrant.133 The ACPA test for unlawful cybersquatting is threeprong. Registration of a domain name violates the ACPA if: (i)
there is a protected mark involved, (ii) which, without regard to
goods and services, a corresponding domain name was registered,
trafficked or used, (iii) with a bad faith intent to profit from that
activity.134 One of the most important innovations of the ACPA is
the substitution of the traditional use in commerce and likelihood
of confusion or dilution elements with the “identical or confusingly
similar” and “bad faith intent to profit” principles.135 Courts
generally reduce ACPA in personam analysis to three elementary
questions: (1) whether the mark in question is distinctive or famous
and therefore entitlement to protection under U.S. trademark
law;136 (2) whether the domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to the mark;137 and (3) whether there was a bad faith intent
to profit on the part of the registrant.138 Upon such finding,
liability under the ACPA is generally imposed and the mark owner
may win effective and powerful relief against the registrant,
including forfeiture, cancellation, and transfer of the mark.139 The
ACPA also allows mark owners to seek statutory damages up to
132

See id. § 1114(2)(D)(v).
See discussion supra Part I.B.1 (describing U.S. personal jurisdiction principles).
134
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
135
See id. Liability is imposed when “bad faith intent to profit” is established in
registering, trafficking, or using a domain name that is identical with or confusingly
similar to a distinctive mark, or identical, or confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a
famous mark. See id. The provision makes no mention of a requirement of “use in
commerce” or a “likelihood of confusion.” See id.
136
See id. § 1125(a) (infringement); id. § 1125(c) (dilution).
137
In the case of famous marks, the ACPA also protects against registrations that are
dilutive of the mark, so long as the mark was famous at the time of the domain name’s
registration. See id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
138
See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001).
139
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C).
133
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$100,000 per infringing domain name,140 along with other Lanham
Act remedies such as actual damages and attorneys’ fees.141
2. In Rem Action
The drafters of the ACPA added the in rem provision to the
new legislation, acknowledging that the speculative nature of
cybersquatting activities may sometimes leave mark owners
without an adequate in personam remedy.142 In order to apply in
rem jurisdiction principles in domain name disputes, courts
generally followed the legislative determination that domain names
were property, or res, entitled to in rem jurisdiction,143 with a
“physical” location where the registration authorities are located.144
140

See id. § 1117(d).
See id. § 1117(a).
142
See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 113–14 (1999) (explaining that the in rem
provision is designed to lessen the difficulty faced by trademark owners when
cybersquatters “register domain names under aliases or otherwise provide false
information in their registration applications in order to avoid identification and service
of process by the mark owner”); see also Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 310 F.3d 293,
298 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the in rem provision “was provided in part to address the
situation in which “‘a non-U.S. resident cybersquats on a domain name that infringes
upon a U.S. trademark’” (quoting 145 CONG. REC. H10823, H10826 (daily ed. Oct. 26,
1999))).
143
See Mattel, 310 F.3d at 300 n.7 (noting that “Congress clearly intended to treat
domain names as property for purposes of the ACPA’s in rem provisions” (citing 145
CONG. REC. H10826 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1999))); Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., v.
Porsche.Net, 302 F.3d 248, 260 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Congress may treat a domain name
registration as property subject to in rem jurisdiction if it chooses, without violating the
Constitution.”); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504
(E.D. Va. 2000) (“There is no prohibition on a legislative body making something
property. Even if a domain name is no more than data, Congress can make data property
and assign its place of registration as its situs.”).
144
See Mattel, 310 F.3d at 301. The court stated:
[B]oth the language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that in rem
jurisdiction is a preexisting fact determined by the location of the disputed
domain name’s registrar or a similar authority, and that the subsequent deposit
of sufficient documents with a court of appropriate jurisdiction confirms the
domain name’s legal situs as being in that judicial district for purposes of the
litigation.
Id. The court further found that the law’s legislative history “makes it clear that Congress
considered the ‘registry or registrar’ to provide a ‘nexus’ for in rem jurisdiction under the
ACPA.” Id. at 302 (quotation marks altered) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14
(1999)); see also Fleetboston Fin. Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d
121, 126 (D. Mass. 2001) (concluding that “the language of the ACPA restricts in rem
141
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The language of the ACPA allows an in rem action when an in
personam action is not feasible,145 or when the registrant cannot be
found through due diligence.146 When the prerequisites for an in
rem action are satisfied, “[t]he owner of a mark may file an in rem
civil action against a domain name in the judicial district in which
the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain
name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is
located.”147 Remedies, however, under the in rem provision are
limited to “a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the
domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of
the mark.”148
The in rem provision has recently been subject to intensive
litigation. U.S. federal courts interpreting the in rem provision
have reached several significant holdings:
• The proper judicial situs for filing an in rem action is the
district in which the domain name registration authority
resides, as opposed to any other U.S. jurisdiction.149
•

When both the registrant and registrar are foreign but the
domain name registry is located in the United States, an in
rem action in the district where the registry resides
satisfies constitutional due process and the establishment
of minimum contacts with that jurisdiction is not
required.150

jurisdiction to the judicial district in which the registrar, registry, or other domain name
authority is located”).
145
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2000); see also Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane
S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.Com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344–45 (E.D. Va. 2001) (finding that
the ACPA in personam and in rem provisions are mutually exclusive).
146
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
147
See id. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
148
See id. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i).
149
See Fleetboston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (concluding that allowing an aggrieved
plaintiff to sue in the state of his or her choosing “would permit a procedure that plainly
offends traditional notions of fair play and justice”).
150
See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., v. Porsche.Net, 302 F.3d 248, 259–260 (4th Cir.
2002) (holding that in a case that directly concerns possession of the defendant domain
names, the registrant’s other personal contacts with the forum are constitutionally
irrelevant to the assertion of in rem jurisdiction over those domain names); see also CNN
I, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“[I]n an ACPA in rem action, it is not
necessary that the allegedly infringing registrant have minimum contacts with the forum;
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•

In order to succeed in an in rem action, proving
registrant’s bad faith is not required.151

•

A federal injunction against a registry located in the
United States is the proper means to enforce the federal
court’s decision to disable or cancel domain name
registration,152 as well as transfer the registration to
plaintiff.153

3. The Reverse Domain Name Highjacking Provision
As previously noted,154 the RDNH provision aims to protect
registrants against unjustified cybersquatting claims.
The
provision states that a domain name registrant whose domain name
has been suspended, disabled, or transferred under a reasonable
policy may, upon notice to the mark owner, file a civil action to
establish that the registration or use of the domain name by such
registrant is not unlawful.155 A court can then grant injunctive
relief to the registrant, including the reactivation of the domain
name or transfer of the domain name to the original registrant.156

it is enough, as here, that the registry is located in the forum; it is enough, as here, that the
registry is located in the forum.”).
151
See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 227–32 (4th Cir.
2002).
152
See GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 623 (E.D. Va.
2003) (“[A] court is not limited merely to the disabling procedure envisioned by [the
registry’s] contractual agreements, but may also order the registry to delete completely a
domain name registration pursuant to the court’s order.”).
153
See Am. Online, Inc. v. AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 453–54 (E.D. Va. 2003).
154
See supra text accompanying note 132. The Fourth Circuit’s Barcelona.com opinion
ably explained the term “reverse domain name highjacking.” The court explained:
If a domain-name registrant cybersquats in violation of the ACPA, he “hijacks”
the domain name from a trademark owner who ordinarily would be expected to
have the right to use the domain name involving his trademark. But when a
trademark owner overreaches in exercising rights under the ACPA, he “reverse
hijacks” the domain name from the domain-name registrant.
Thus,
§ 1114(2)(D)(v), enacted to protect domain-name registrants against
overreaching trademark owners, may be referred to as the “reverse domain
name hijacking” provision.
Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 625 n.1
(4th Cir. 2003).
155
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v).
156
Id.
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The provision is well illustrated by the First Circuit’s opinion
in Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA.157 David Sallen, a
U.S.
resident,158
registered
the
domain
name
<www.corinthians.com> with Network Solutions Inc. (“NSI”).159
The famous Brazilian soccer team, Corinthiao (Portuguese for
“Corinthians”), which had, inter alia, Brazilian trademark rights in
the mark CORINTHIAO, filed and won a complaint under the
UDRP.160 Within the required ten days, Sallen filed a federal
lawsuit in the United States,161 seeking a declaratory judgment that
his registration for the domain name did not violate the ACPA.162
At some point, apparently for the purpose of intercepting the
motion for declaratory judgment, the defendant soccer team
disclaimed any intention to bring further ACPA claims against
Sallen.163 The defendant moved to dismiss Sallen’s complaint,
arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,164
because Sallen requested a declaration of his rights under the
ACPA and defendant had no intent to sue Sallen under the act.165
Accepting defendant’s argument, the district court ruled that there
was no real controversy between the parties and thus, a declaratory
judgment could not be obtained for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.166 This interpretation suggests that under certain
157

273 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001).
Id. at 16.
159
Id. at 20. At the time of registration in August 1998, Network Solutions Inc. (“NSI”)
was the only registry and registrar for domain names listed in the <.com> gTLD file. See
Barcelona.com, 189 F. Supp. 2d 367, 370 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d and vacated, 330 F.3d
617 (4th Cir. 2003).
160
See Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA v. David Sallen, WIPO Case No. D20000461 (July 17, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0461.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
161
See Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, No. 00-CV-11555, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19976 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2000).
162
See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 22.
163
See Sallen, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19976, at *1.
164
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
165
See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 22. Interestingly, there is no indication in the Sallen district
court’s opinion that defendants moved to dismiss also for a lack of personal jurisdiction,
and thus, this matter was not discussed. See Sallen, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19976.
166
The district court stated:
Based on the representations made by Defendant . . . that it “has no intent to
sue Plaintiff under the ACPA for his past activities in connection with
corinthians.com” the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED . . . Jurisdiction under
158
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circumstances, the UDRP decisions are indeed binding in the
United States, despite the explicit intention of the policy’s drafters
and the language of the policy itself.167
As a result of the district court’s decision the domain name was
transferred, and Sallen appealed to the First Circuit.168 The
appellate court reversed the district court’s decision, holding that
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) granted domain registrants who have
lost domain names under UDRP administrative panel decisions an
affirmative cause of action in federal court for a declaration of
nonviolation of the ACPA and for the return of the wrongfully
transferred domain names.169 The court concluded:
Although [defendant] has stated that it has no intent to sue
Sallen under the ACPA for his past actions related to
corinthians.com, there is indeed a controversy between
Sallen and [Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA (“CL”)]:
Sallen asserts that he has rights to corinthians.com and CL
asserts that it has mutually exclusive rights to the same
domain name. Since the dismissal of Sallen’s complaint,
the corinthians.com domain name has been transferred to
CL and is now being used to promote the Corinthians
soccer team. Sallen asserts that the domain name belongs
to him.170
The court’s decision rejected the defendants’ argument that
there was no case or controversy.171 Interestingly, at the time
when the appellate decision was rendered, the motion for
declaratory judgment was no longer appropriate since the domain
name was no longer in Sallen’s possession. The appellate court,
however, offered a potential solution for future litigation,
suggesting in a footnote that if Sallen had been given the
28 U.S.C. § 2201 [authorizing declaratory judgments] is proper only if there
exists an actual controversey [sic] between the parties. Absent the threat of suit
there is no controversy and jurisdiction is lacking.
Sallen, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19976, at *1–*2 (citation omitted).
167
See supra text accompanying notes 115–118.
168
Sallen, 273 F.3d at 25.
169
See id. at 24–30.
170
Id. at 25.
171
See id. at 25–30.

EFRONI FORMAT

60

12/9/2003 2:31 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 14:29

opportunity to amend his complaint, then he could have properly
sought an injunction.172 This determination was the first indication
from an appellate court that injunctions and declaratory relief
under the RDNH provision are appropriate remedies for registrants
seeking reversal of UDRP decisions.
Part of the controversy in Sallen involved language in the
RDNH provision requiring notice to be given to the “mark owner”
upon the filing of an action to establish that the use of a mark is not
unlawful.173 The defendant argued that the term “mark owner” in
that statute refers only to registered U.S. trademarks.174
Accordingly, the defendant argued that registrant protection under
the RDNH provision cannot apply to its mark, which was
registered in Brazil but not in the United States.175 The Sallen
court rejected this argument based on legal analysis of the
language and definitions of the law.176 In addition, the court
provided a policy argument for broad reading of the provision:
[I]nterpreting “mark owner” to apply only to registered
U.S. marks would create a perverse result at odds with our
view of the ACPA as granting relief to registrants who have
wrongly lost domain names in UDRP proceedings. It
would be very odd if Congress, which was well aware of
the international nature of trademark disputes, protected
Americans against reverse domain name hijacking only
when a registered American mark owner was doing the
hijacking. Such a policy would permit American citizens,
172

See id. at 16 n.1. The court stated:
Sallen’s initiation of these proceedings in the district court stayed the WIPO
panel’s order to transfer the domain name to [the defendant]. After the district
court dismissed Sallen’s suit, however, the domain name was transferred to
[Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA], possibly wrongfully in light of a pending
appeal. If the complaint were reinstated, the logic of Sallen’s position is that he
would seek leave to amend his complaint to request an injunction returning the
domain name.
Id. (citation omitted).
173
See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) (A losing registrant “may, upon notice to the mark
owner, file a civil action to establish that the registration or use of the domain name by
such registrant is not unlawful under this chapter.”).
174
Sallen, 273 F.3d at 24.
175
Id. at 24 & n.10.
176
Id. at 23–24.
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whose domain names are subject to WIPO transfer orders,
to get relief against abusive mark owners that have
registered in the U.S., but not against abusive mark owners
that have not registered (including both foreign mark
owners and domestic mark owners that have not
registered). It would leave registrants unprotected against
reverse domain name hijackers so long as the hijackers are
not registered with the PTO.177
The court was obviously concerned that a narrow reading of
the provision could yield absurd results, with registrants having no
recourse against unregistered- or foreign-mark owners who have
prevailed in a UDRP proceeding.178 Another related jurisdictional
question—one left unresolved even after Sallen—is whether an
RDNH action requires establishment of in personam jurisdiction.
This issue was not discussed in either the district court opinion or
circuit court opinion in Sallen, and there is no indication in either
opinion that the defendant, a foreign soccer team asserting a
foreign trademark, introduced an in personam jurisdiction
objection.179 Because personal jurisdiction was not directly
discussed in Sallen, the opinion leaves open an interesting
question: could the U.S. registrant use in rem principles as an
alternative jurisdictional basis for his or her RDNH claim?
As noted above, the ACPA in rem provision is not helpful
when the mark is not protected in the United States.180 In addition,
the provision is available only to “the owner of a mark,” as
distinguished from a domain name registrant.181 Lastly, the RDNH
provision does not specifically provide for in rem jurisdiction.
Thus, a court might conclude that absent personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, the RDNH action should be dismissed.
The above quoted language from Sallen, however, provides a
rationale for a different analysis leading to the opposite result. The
Sallen court gave an expansive interpretation to the term “mark
177

Id. at 24 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 23–24.
179
See Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, No. 00-CV-11555, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19976, at *1–*2 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2000); Sallen, 273 F.3d at 20–30.
180
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (protecting only Lanham Act marks).
181
See id.
178
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owner” appearing in the RDNH provision. As explained by the
court, the reason was to protect U.S. registrants, such as Sallen,
against reverse-domain-name-hijacking commenced by foreign
owners.182 Further requirement of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant could easily frustrate the purpose of Sallen’s mark
owner interpretation.183
The comparison of Sallen’s mark owner interpretation to the
rationale behind the legislation of the in rem provision is
inevitable. It should not be hard to demonstrate how U.S. plaintiffregistrants might face difficult procedural setbacks in
circumstances where foreign defendant-owners’ activity does not
meet personal jurisdiction tests. Despite the fact that a winning
UDRP mark owner may prevent a U.S. registrant from using a
domain name worldwide and also in the United States—that is,
over the Internet—the registrant would not be able to sue under the
ACPA without establishing personal jurisdiction. This was exactly
the problem that American mark owners faced while attempting to
challenge foreign registrants under pre-ACPA American law, and
this was exactly the reason why the in rem provision was
legislated.184
Put differently, Sallen’s “mark owner” interpretation coupled
with ACPA in rem rationale may enable a court to read the in rem
jurisdiction authority into the RDNH provision.185 Although this is
182

Sallen, 273 F.3d at 24.
In order to illustrate this point, assume that the defendant in the Sallen case had
succeeded in a hypothetical personal jurisdiction objection. In such case, no matter how
broad the term “mark owner” is interpreted, the court probably would have had to dismiss
the suit due to lack of jurisdictional basis.
184
See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (providing background to the legislation of the in
rem provision).
185
A pre-ACPA case suggested that the district court did not have jurisdiction in a suit
filed against the domain names themselves absent specific authority provided in the
relevant statutory language (in that case, by the FTDA) giving the court subject-matter
jurisdiction. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.com, 51 F. Supp. 2d. 707, 711–13
(E.D. Va. 1999), vacated due to a superseding statute by Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v.
Allporsche.com, 215 F.3d 1320 (4th Cir. 2000) (table), and remanded in part by Porsche
Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002). The court applied rule
4(n) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the FTDA and found that such in rem
jurisdiction could not be exercised. Id. at 711–12. Without conducting a detailed
comparison between the Porsche decision and a hypothetical application of in rem
jurisdiction in a reverse domain name hijacking (“RDNH”) case, at least one commentary
183
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purely a theoretical solution to a theoretical problem, it may draw
attention to the fact that by using existing legal tools, U.S. courts
might further extend the application of the ACPA also against
foreign owners without the need to meet the burden of personal
jurisdiction and perhaps, where such owner has no minimum
contacts with the United States.186
Despite this area of uncertainty, the Sallen decision represents
an important moment in U.S. domain name disputes jurisprudence.
It provides that a losing registrant may bring a RDNH action
against the mark owner and obtain relief before and after the
implementation of the UDRP. Further, the opinion illustrates a
crucial point: under the ACPA, registrants should be able to attack
UDRP decisions in disputes involving any kind of marks, U.S. and
foreign. As will be discussed further, this aspect of Sallen bears
important consequences for international domain name disputes
litigated in the United States.
III. THE BARCELONA.COM DISPUTE
After this long but necessary background, this Article turns its
focus to the Fourth Circuit’s June 2003 opinion in the case of
Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de
Barcelona,187 which unanimously reversed, vacated, and remanded
the lower court’s decision, rendered by Chief Judge Claude M.
Hilton of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.188
has suggested that application of in rem jurisdiction does not require specific authority in
the law. See Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97,
117 (2000). Professor Lee stated:
The Porsche Cars court’s analysis misconstrues the very nature of in rem
jurisdiction. A proceeding in rem is not an anomalous action requiring special
statutory authorization to overcome some sort of disfavored status. Rather, the
designation “in rem” is one of two longstanding bases on which a court
traditionally has acquired territorial jurisdiction over a dispute.
Id.
186
As described infra Part IV.D.1, it appears that U.S. courts do not require the
establishment of minimum contacts over foreign registrants in ACPA in rem provision
actions.
187
330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003).
188
Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 189 F. Supp. 2d
367 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d and vacated, 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003).
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Section A of this part describes the factual background of the
dispute over the domain name <www.barcelona.com> between a
Spanish couple and the City Council of Barcelona, Spain.
Subsection B describes the Fourth Circuit’s decision on appeal.
A. The Facts189
In February 1996, Joan Nogueras Cobo (“Nogueras”), a
Spanish
citizen,
registered
the
domain
name
<www.barcelona.com> in the name of his wife with the U.S.
registrar, NSI.190 On the Web site, the couple provided tourist
information about Barcelona, e-mail services, a chat room, and
links to other Web sites.191 In early 1999, the Nogueras e-mailed
the mayor of Barcelona (“Mayor”) through a Web form on the
official Web site of the City Council of Barcelona (“City
Council”), proposing to negotiate with the City Council for its
acquisition of the Web site, but Nogueras received no response.192
Later that year, Nogueras and a business partner formed
Barcelona.com, Inc. under Delaware law to own and run the Web
site.193 Although the Barcelona.com, Inc. maintains a New York
mailing address, it has no employees in the United States, does not
own or lease office space in the country, and does not have a phone
listing in the United States.194 Furthermore, its computer server is
in Spain.195
In March 2000, the City Council contacted Nogueras to learn
more about the corporation and its plans for the domain name.
Nogueras and his marketing director met with City Council
representatives and later sent them a business plan for the Web
site.196 The negotiations did not ripen into an agreement, however,
189

In describing the background of the dispute, the relies on the facts as described in
both the district court and circuit court decisions.
190
Barcelona.com, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
191
Id.
192
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 620.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id. Soon after the city council made its demand, Norgueras had the domain name
transferred from his wife’s name to the corporation, which he had neglected to do in 1999
when the corporation was formed. Id. at 620–21.
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and in May 2000 the City Council demanded the transfer of the
domain name to its possession.197
After Barcelona.com, Inc. refused to surrender the domain
name, the City Council, which owned numerous trademark
registrations in Spain incorporating the word Barcelona,198
launched a UDRP proceeding against the registrants claiming that
the registration of the domain name violated the UDRP.199 The
City Council won the UDRP proceeding, with a panelist200 from
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) concluding,
inter alia, (1) that the city had trademark rights in the term
Barcelona under Spanish law, and (2) that the domain name was
registered and used in bad faith.201 Thus, the registration was held
to violate the UDRP.202 Consequently, the domain name was
ordered transferred to the City Council, in accord with the UDRP
authority.203
Before the execution of the transfer order,
Barcelona.com, Inc. commenced a lawsuit in the District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking declaratory judgment and
asserting, inter alia, that the registration of the domain name was
not unlawful.204 Consequently, and in accordance with the UDRP
rules, the transfer was automatically halted until a further ruling by
the district court.205
The district court’s decision validated the transfer, concluding
that under Spanish law the City Council was probably the rightful
owner of all marks incorporating the term Barcelona.206
Furthermore, the district court concluded that the registrants
demonstrated “bad faith intent to profit” and therefore, the

197

Id. at 621.
Id.
199
See Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona v. Barcelona.com, Inc., WIPO Case
No. D2000-0505 (Aug. 4, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0505.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
200
In this instance, a single WIPO panelist, Marino Porzio, rendered the UDRP
decision. Id.
201
Id. ¶ 5.
202
Id.
203
Id. ¶ 6.
204
Barcelona.com, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
205
See UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 4(k).
206
Barcelona.com, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
198
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registration could not be declared “not unlawful.”207 The district
court also discussed the City Council cybersquatting counterclaims
and found that the ACPA also protected foreign marks against
cybersquatting.208 Since the City Council demonstrated that it had
valid rights under the law of Spain, and since the domain name
was identical or confusingly similar to the marks owned by the
city, the prayer for a declaratory judgment in favor of the
registrants was denied.209
B. The Forth Circuit Ruling
The Fourth Circuit in a unanimous opinion reversed, vacated,
and remanded the lower court’s decision to validate the transfer of
the mark to the City Council.210 The Forth Circuit’s analysis, as
laid out in its opinion, has four key aspects: (1) jurisdictional
issues; (2) applicability of foreign law; (3) elements of the RDNH
provision; and (4) the protection extended under U.S. law to the
Barcelona mark.211
1. Jurisdictional Issues
First, the court determined that under the ACPA’s RDNH
provision,212 it had subject matter jurisdiction,213 in accord with the
First Circuit’s decision in the case of Sallen v. Corinthians
Licenciamentos LTDA.214 As noted earlier in this Article, the
RDNH provision confers a specific cause of action and relevant
remedies in a federal court to a registrant losing in a UDRP
proceeding and seeking to reverse the panel’s decision and retain
his or her domain name registration.215 The provision, in essence,
gives the losing registrant a second chance to prove in federal court
207

Id. at 372–73.
Id. at 373–76. See also infra note 262 (discussing these “counterclaims” that
apparently were never filed).
209
See id. at 376–77.
210
Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617 (4th
Cir. 2003).
211
See id.
212
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) (2000).
213
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 623.
214
273 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001).
215
See supra Part II.B.3.
208
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that the registration is not unlawful under the Lanham Act.
Tracing back to the policy behind the ACPA and the objectives of
Congress in enacting it, the court concluded that “because the
UDRP is susceptible of being grounded on principles foreign or
hostile to American law, the ACPA authorizes reversing a panel
decision if such a result is called for by application of the Lanham
Act.”216
The general rule allowing the registrant’s cause of action was
already determined in Sallen.217 In this case, Barcelona.com, Inc.
was a domain name registrant that lost its registration in a UDRP
proceeding, and hence, the ACPA gave the court subject matter
jurisdiction over the dispute.218 The City Council argued that upon
filing the complaint to the UDRP panel it agreed to be subject to
the jurisdiction of “‘the Courts of Virginia (United States), only
with respect to any challenge that may be made by [Nogueras] to a
decision by the Administrative Panel to transfer or cancel the
domain name that are subject to this complaint.’”219 In line with
this argument, the City Council, as understood by the court, agreed
to submit to the jurisdiction of the federal court in a suit under the
RDNH provision. According to the City Council’s theory,
however, the federal court was limited to the law applied in the
panel’s decision—in this case, Spanish trademark law.220 Put
differently, the City Council partially objected to the jurisdiction of
the federal court, at least with respect to the potential application of
U.S. law.
The court, rejecting this contention, reiterated that the UDRP
proceeding is not jurisdictional in nature.221 At the end of part II of
216

Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 626.
See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 28 (explaining that “a federal court’s interpretation of the
ACPA supplants a WIPO panel’s interpretation of the UDRP”), noted in Barcelona.com,
330 F.3d at 626.
218
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 623.
219
Id. at 621 (citing the City Council’s complaint).
220
Id. at 623. It is not exactly clear from the language of the decision whether the city
council tried to make a personal jurisdiction objection or subject matter objection. On the
one hand, an assertion that the court’s review is limited to application of a certain law
more resembles a subject matter challenge. When a party agrees to litigate in a certain
jurisdiction or limits such an agreement to a certain jurisdiction, however, such an
agreement is enforceable and relevant only to questions of personal jurisdiction.
221
Id. at 623.
217
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the decision, the court concluded that the only possible
significance of a previous UDRP process in this context was that it
triggered the RDNH provision.222
Furthermore, the court
concluded that it was not limited in any way by the WIPO
proceeding and the law applied there.223 In sum, the federal court
had jurisdiction over the City Council and over the dispute, and the
UDRP decision, including the law applied under the procedure,
had no bearing on the federal court’s jurisdictional reach and legal
analysis.
2. Foreign Law Not Applicable
In the second part of the analysis, the court gave no deference
to Spanish law and determined that the district court erred in
analyzing the parties’ rights under a foreign legal system.224 The
RDNH provision provides a cause of action to the losing registrant
and allows a plaintiff to show in federal court that the registration
is “not unlawful under this chapter.”225 The chapter being referred
to is chapter 22 of title 15 of the U.S. Code, which contains the
Lanham Act; and foreign law was not applicable.226
3. The Elements of the RDNH Provision
Third, the court enumerated the elements of the section
1114(2)(D)(v) cause of action, finding each to be present in this
case. Under the statute, plaintiff must show that (1) he or she is the
domain name registrant; (2) his or her domain name was
suspended, disabled or transferred under a policy implemented by
the registrar (here, the UDRP); (3) that the owner of the mark had a
notice of the action in federal court and; (4) that plaintiff’s
222

Id. at 625.
See id. at 626.
224
Id. at 627.
225
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 627 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) (2000)). The
Barcelona.com court noted that the original language of ACPA provides that the
registrant may sue to declare that the domain name’s use by such registrant is “not
unlawful under this Act,” with “Act” defined to refer to the Trademark Act of 1946 (the
Lanham Act). Id. at 627 n.2 (citing 113 Stat. 1501A-550, § 3004 (1999)). But upon
codification, the term “this Act” became “this chapter,” i.e., chapter 22 of title 15, which
contains the Lanham Act. Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 627 n.2.
226
See Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 627 & n.2.
223
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registration or use of the domain name is not unlawful under the
Lanham Act, as amended.227 Since the first three elements of the
test were undisputed and since the City Council did not even
attempt to prove trademark rights in the term Barcelona under U.S.
law, the court determined that Barcelona.com, Inc. was entitled to
the protection of the RDNH provision.228
4. BARCELONA Is Not a Protected Mark in the United
States
Fourth and last, the court explained that even had the City
Council tried to defend its trademark rights in the term Barcelona
under U.S. law, it would have been of no avail. Because the
Lanham Act did not protect purely descriptive-geographical
designations,229 and because the City Council could show no
evidence that the name Barcelona acquired any secondary meaning
other than the city itself, the term was not protected under U.S.
law.230
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROBLEMS IN THE PRESENT STATE
OF THE LAW
This part, divided into five sections, further analyzes the
court’s opinion and explores its possible consequences. Section A
explains why the Barcelona.com court probably rendered a correct
application of ACPA under the circumstances. Section B discusses
and criticizes the opinion’s territoriality justification for the result.
Subsection C reviews some emerging litigation strategies and the
development of a “partial reverse effect” pushing owners of
foreign marks away from UDRP and back to litigation in foreign
courts. Section D describes the outcome of Barcelona.com in the
227

Id. at 626.
Id. at 626–29.
229
Id. at 628–29 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (2000)).
230
Id. at 629. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit in Barcelona.com briefly addressed the
district court’s discussion of the city’s counterclaims of an ACPA violation by the
plaintiff-registrant. The circuit court found that the city had never filed a counterclaim
and thus vacated the rulings that arose from the “phantom counterclaim.” Id at 629; see
also infra note 262.
228
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context of other court decisions, attempting to convey the larger
context of contemporary cybersquatting jurisprudence in the
United States. This section classifies recent ACPA case law into
three categories having particular relevance in international
disputes. It further highlights the “laundry machine effect” and its
paradox, a troublesome aspect of current ACPA interpretation.
Finally, Section E discusses the implications of current
cybersquatting jurisprudence for owners of foreign marks and
some possible foreign reactions to that legal landscape.
A. Correct Application of the Law
The two major innovations of the Barcelona.com case in the
field of domain name disputes are probably the following: (1) the
Barcelona.com court was the first appellate court to state and
clarify the elements of the RDNH cause of action; and (2) it
concluded that courts should look only to U.S. law to determine
whether a registration is lawful.
It seems that the Barcelona.com court’s legal analysis is
technically correct. With respect to the principal controversy
between the parties, the language of ACPA is clear and
straightforward. The RDNH provision231 explicitly provides the
law under which registration should be scrutinized in a RDNH
situation—”the registration or use . . . is not unlawful under this
chapter.”232 Additionally, ACPA was mainly crafted by the U.S.
Congress to protect U.S. marks in U.S. federal courts.233
Therefore, the RDNH provision applies the U.S standard for
unlawful cybersquatting.234 A conclusion that the provision
mandates analysis under foreign system would give U.S. courts
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate marks recognized by every
231

15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) (2000).
Id. (emphasis added); see supra note 225.
233
Senator Spence Abraham of Michigan, one of the Congressional sponsors of the
ACPA, stated, “This legislation will combat a new form of high tech fraud that is causing
confusion and inconvenience for consumers . . . and posing an enormous threat to a
century of pre-Internet American business efforts.” 145 CONG. REC. S7334 (daily ed.
June 21, 1999) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (emphasis added).
234
An example of an alternative standard could be found in UDRP, supra note 98, ¶
4(a). See also discussion supra Part II.A.1 (describing the UDRP cybersquatting
standard).
232

EFRONI FORMAT

2003]

12/9/2003 2:31 PM

BETTER MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN DISPUTES

71

possible trademark regime of any country.235 In other words, such
a reading would effectively render ACPA a kind of conduit,
bringing validity questions of all world marks under the scrutiny of
U.S. courts—a result that would be at odds with common sense.236
B. The Territoriality Argument
It is interesting to observe the emphasis the court put on
territoriality in trademark law. In part III of the Barcelona.com
decision, which reinforced the Fourth Circuit’s opinion about the
exclusive application of U.S. law, the court noted237 that both the
United States and Spain have been longtime members of the Paris
Convention of 1883.238 The Paris Convention recognizes the
independence of trademark rights among its member states.239
Furthermore, the Paris Convention does not grant greater
protection in the United States to foreign marks than what is
already secured under the Lanham Act.240
This is probably an accurate statement of the law, although
slightly flawed. The problem derives from the attempt to justify a
certain reading of the ACPA using traditional territoriality
principles. As noted earlier, U.S. trademark law aims to prevent
confusion and unlawful commercial competition practices. In
235

Interestingly, the ACPA uses different language regarding the trademarks falling
under its various provisions. The ACPA in rem provision specifically limits its
applicability to registered U.S. marks and those marks protected under Lanham Act
dilution and infringement provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i). The language of
the in personam provision plainly protects “a mark.” See id. § 1125(d)(1)(A). Similarly,
it appears that the language of the RDNH provision refers to a “mark owner” (against
whom this provision can be exercised) without further specifications. See also infra note
262 and accompanying text.
236
See discussion infra Part IV.D.4 (arguing that the Barcelona.com court reached the
only reasonable result under the circumstances).
237
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 628.
238
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
amended at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
239
Article 6(3) of the Paris Convention secures the territorial independence of marks,
thus allowing every member-state discretion whether to grant protection within its
territory to foreign marks protected in other member states. See Paris Convention, supra
note 238, art. 6(3), noted in Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 628.
240
See Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 628 (citing Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. Majestic
Distilling Co., 958 F.2d 594, 597 (4th Cir. 1992); Int’l Cafe, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe
Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)).
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many cases, trademark protection, while securing private
monopolies that grant exclusive use of certain marks by certain
commercial players, may be justified only if applied within a
certain territory where those commercial practices are potentially
harmful. For example, when courts and commentators talk about
likelihood of confusion it is clear that such confusion may occur
only where consumers recognize the mark as a source identifier.241
In other words, in order to be protected in a particular jurisdiction,
a mark must meet that jurisdiction’s legal tests for protection. In
some jurisdictions, this means executing the formalities of
registration. Meanwhile, in the U.S. federal system the crux is the
use in U.S. commerce requirement.242
Hence, trademark law can be described as territorial. The
digital-commercial reality introduced new challenges to this
territoriality concept; thus, the ACPA was enacted to address these
challenges.243 One of the act’s responses to those challenges was
the relinquishment of the likelihood of confusion requirement,244 a
highly territory-sensitive element of trademark protection.
Furthermore, the ACPA imposes liability without a showing that
the domain name was used in commerce at all.245 The former sine
qua non concept of use in commerce as an essential element of any
trademark infringement or dilution claim in the United States is

241

See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 66, § 29:4, at 29-10 (noting that
foreign marks famous in the United States “should be legally recognized in the United
States”).
242
See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (“[T]he right
to a particular mark grows out of its use.”). The opinion further discusses geographic
scope of use-based rights. See id. at 97–104.
243
See discussion supra Part I.C (explaining why “offline” trademark law failed to
effectively protect marks in online activities).
244
The ACPA in personam provision replaced that test with the “identical or
confusingly similar” test, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000), which arguably bears much
lower burden of proof than “likelihood of confusion.” See, e.g., Morrison & Foerster,
LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130 (D. Colo. 2000). The in personam provision
also imposes liability “without regard to the goods or services of the parties.” 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(1)(A).
245
ACPA does not include a requirement of “use in commerce” for in personam actions.
In rem actions, however, are subject to the traditional limitations of the trademark
infringement and dilution statutes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i).

EFRONI FORMAT

2003]

12/9/2003 2:31 PM

BETTER MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN DISPUTES

73

also territory sensitive.246 Both the likelihood of confusion and use
in commerce requirements were abandoned by the ACPA’s in
personam provisions, inter alia, because those traditional concepts
dictated territorial protection that was insufficient in the context of
the Internet.
As explained earlier, domain names are both unique and have
global reach. They are unique in that only one entity can register a
single domain name worldwide. Global reach means that domain
names are instantly, cheaply, and simultaneously accessible and
recognizable by Internet users all over the world, without territorial
boundaries or limitations. These characteristics of domain names
had a major influence on the formulation of the ACPA, including
its RDNH provision. In sum, trademark territoriality theory
provides a good explanation why U.S. law, and only U.S. law,
should determine trademark rights and protection in U.S. territory.
When the question is why should U.S. law, and only U.S. law,
determine trademark protection of a Spanish mark that is arguably
infringed on Spanish soil, the territoriality theory does not furnish
the most satisfactory reasoning.
C. Emerging Litigation Strategies
Generally speaking, after more than three years of intensive
litigation where the ACPA was heavily used against abusive
registrants and registrations, it is now safe to say that this U.S.
legislation virtually eliminated the benefits of cybersquatting in
gTLDs to classic cybersquatters such as Toeppen247 and
Zuccarini.248 Assuming the rulings of the Fourth and the First
Circuits in Barcelona.com and Sallen, respectively, survive the
rapid changes and evolution of technology and technology-related
law, it should also be relatively safe for losing registrants to rely on
the RDNH cause of action where the registration is determined not
to violate U.S. law. Consequently, registrants can protect their
domain name registrations in U.S. courts from the fast and
unpredictable UDRP process, where a panel can decide a dispute
246

See supra note 78 (listing prominent examples of the “use in commerce” requirement
in the Lanham Act).
247
See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
248
See, e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001).
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“in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and
principles of law that it deems applicable.”249
After the
Barcelona.com decision, federal courts are expected to decide on
RDNH provision actions by taking into consideration only marks
that are recognized under U.S. trademark law. Hence, it becomes
clear that a mark owner, whose rights in the mark are recognized
only by a foreign system, will almost automatically lose in RDNH
provision actions. This alarming consequence calls for further
discussion in possible litigation strategies.250
1. The Registrant’s (Probably) Winning Strategy
Suppose that you are a prospective registrant contemplating
registration of a certain domain name, for example,
<www.schlecker.com>.251 You are aware that there is a foreign
mark (i.e., a non-U.S. protected mark) incorporated and held by a
foreign commercial entity called Schlecker.252 You envision a
possible dispute, and since a UDRP action is usually more
attractive to mark owners than court litigation, it is more likely that
the troubles will come from a UDRP complainant attacking your
registration.253
In order to maximize your chances of keeping the domain
name, you may implement a simple strategy: choose a U.S.
registrar with its principal office in the United States and register
249

UDRP RULES, supra note 106, ¶ 15(a) (emphasis added).
Litigation strategies refer generally to the behavior of parties before and during
litigation which is intended to increase their chances of winning in court.
251
It should be noted at the outset that this hypothetical does not speculate on your
specific mens rea (i.e., the existence of bad faith or other types of mental state). This is to
avoid sensitivity of the hypothetical to different cybersquatting standards. The
hypothetical assumes that you are only aware of the existence of the foreign mark, no
more and no less.
252
For purposes of this hypothetical, one is aware that Schlecker is the name of a
famous drugstore retailer chain in Germany. The good news is, however, that Schlecker
is not a registered mark in the United States, engages in no commercial activity, and does
have a single American shop. Additionally, the name is not generally familiar to U.S.
consumers. The better news, however, is that Schlecker neglected to register the domain
<http://www.schlecker.com> before you came up with the idea.
253
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing UDRP and its attractiveness to mark owners). This
assertion is especially valid in an international dispute, involving parties and rights from
both sides of the Atlantic.
250
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your domain name, making sure the owner of the registration is a
U.S. entity with a U.S. address to appear in the registrar’s Whois
database.254 Next, wait for the UDRP complaint to arrive and
when it does, defend your registration in the UDRP process.255 If
you win the UDRP proceeding256 and the mark owner decides not
to challenge the result in court, the domain name is yours.257
Conversely, if you lose under the UDRP, then file a RDNH
provision suit in a U.S. federal court of mutual jurisdiction against
that mark owner within ten business days. As explained above,
upon such filing the cancellation or transfer of your domain name
will have an automatic stay until the matter is resolved in court or
otherwise.258 The mark owner will have difficulty objecting to the
court’s personal jurisdiction, since upon filing the UDRP
complaint he or she agreed to submit to a court of mutual
jurisdiction in adjudicating disputes concerning the domain
name.259 Thus, the mark owner is arguably locked into the federal
254

It appears that your own citizenship or domiciliary is irrelevant for the success of the
strategy.
255
You should remember to strictly comply with the procedural UDRP Rules,
particularly with the rule 5(a) requirement of a timely response, as well as with the other
rule 5 guidelines for submitting a response. See UDRP RULES, supra note 106, ¶ 5.
256
Registrants, however, have a statistically better chance to lose a UDRP process than
to win it. See Michael Geist, Fundamentally Fair.com? An Update on Bias Allegations
and the ICANN, at http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/fairupdate.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2003)
(examining 4,332 early UDRP decisions and finding that registrants statistically lose in a
significant majority of the cases); see also Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: An Analysis of
ICANN’s Uniform Dispute, Digital Convergence Center, at http://dcc.syr.edu/reports.htm
(finding that registrants lost in almost 80 percent of the UDRP decision rendered in its
first year of implementation) (Nov. 2000).
257
Mark owners, as well as registrants, may challenge UDRP decisions in a court of
competent jurisdiction: “The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements . . . shall
not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of
competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory administrative
proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded.” UDRP, supra note 98,
¶ 4(k) (emphasis added). A definition of “competent jurisdiction,” however, can be
found neither in the Policy nor in the UDRP Rules.
258
UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 4(k).
259
In its Barcelona.com opinion, the Fourth Circuit chronicled the district court’s
proceedings in response to “the City Council’s argument that ‘failure to consider the
basis for the [WIPO] decision would remove the basis for [this court’s] jurisdiction.’” See
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 623. The court stated:
[Barcelona.com, Inc.’s] complaint, brought in the Eastern District of
Virginia . . . originally asserted three claims in three separate counts: a claim
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court, no matter what connection he or she has with the forum.260
Since the mark owner has only foreign trademark rights to
vindicate, you may expect an almost certain victory in the federal
court.261
A possible wrinkle in this strategy appears when the mark
owner launches a less typical offensive—skipping UDRP and
suing you in court for trademark infringement or dilution. Again,
assuming no U.S. trademark rights are involved, the ACPA as
applied by a U.S. court would probably leave mark owners with no
recourse.262 If sued in a foreign court, however, with or without a
for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v);
a claim for fraud and unfair competition; and a claim for tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage. In response to the City Council’s
motion to dismiss on various jurisdictional grounds, [Barcelona.com, Inc.]
voluntarily dismissed all claims except its claim under § 1114(2)(D)(v). After
the district court denied the City Council’s motion to dismiss, the City Council
filed an answer, stating as one of its affirmative defenses:
This court lacks jurisdiction over Defendant for any cause of action other
than Plaintiff’s challenge to the arbitrator’s Order issued in the UDRP
domain name arbitration proceeding.
Id. (emphasis added). It may be reasonable to assume that even Barcelona.com, Inc.
believed, already in an early stage of litigation, that its only real chance to assert
jurisdiction was through the application of the RDNH provision. This aspect of the case
also illustrates the city’s confusion regarding the difference between personal jurisdiction
and subject matter jurisdiction. See supra note 220.
260
In fact, the chief director of the city council “submitted an affidavit stating that ‘[t]he
City does not own and is not using any trademarks in the United States, to identify any
goods or services.’” Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 629.
261
But see McNeil v. Stanley Works, No. 00-16557, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 6762, at *3
(9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2002) (doubting the contractual enforceability of a UDRP
complainant’s forum choice with respect to challenges of UDRP decisions) (dictum).
262
The ACPA’s in rem provision specifically includes only those marks protected under
the Lanham Act against infringement or dilution or registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i) (2000). The ACPA’s in personam
provision more broadly covers “mark[s].” See id. § 1125(d)(1)(A). “Mark” is defined in
the Lanham Act as “any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark.”
Id. § 1127. Additionally, the Sallen decision indicates that the term “mark owner” as
used in the RDNH provision covers not only U.S. marks, but also any trademark. See
Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v)). Accordingly, owners of foreign marks may arguably bring
ACPA in personam actions in U.S. courts. Since the Sallen decision is an RDNH
decision and not an in personam decision, however, the author assumes that the holding is
binding only in that context, although a more expansive reading is plausible. For
example, the Barcelona.com district court, discussing possible counterclaims of the city
council, concluded that the ACPA in personam provision protected foreign marks. See
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preceding UDRP process, you should fiercely object to that court’s
jurisdiction. If the challenge fails, you may need to prove
legitimate use of the registration according to that jurisdiction’s
rules.263
Finally, even if you lose in the foreign court and that court
issues an order in favor of the mark owner, it is not over yet. You
may still eventually prevail in a U.S. federal court. To date, there
is at least one such example: a federal district court ordered
Verisign—which was the domain name registry—to ignore a
Korean court decision ordering the Korean registrar not to transfer
a domain name.264
2. The Foreign-Mark Owner’s (Probably) Losing Strategy
Now imagine yourself in the shoes of the hypothetical
Schlecker (i.e., the owner of a foreign mark having its mark
registered by a sophisticated registrant). The best strategy is to
skip the UDRP and sue directly where the mark is protected.265
The reason is rather straightforward: the foreign mark owner
knows that even if it wins under the UDRP, it may be forced to
Barcelona.com, Inc., v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 189 F. Supp. 2d 367,
373–374 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d and vacated, 330 F.3d 617. The Fourth Circuit,
however, vacated this finding, concluding that the city never filed such counterclaims.
330 F.3d at 629. Thus, this issue remains open.
263
Notice, however, that international jurisdictions would probably have to adjudicate
the dispute according to traditional trademark law and some newly evolved doctrines
created to deal with cybersquatting. Thus far, it seems the United States is alone in
legislating such a powerful tool against cybersquatting as the ACPA. See Sharrock, supra
note 17, at 826–27 (comparing cybersquatting remedies available in U.S. courts to those
available outside the United States). But see infra notes 331, 344 (noting Japan’s
cybersquatting protection).
264
See GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 625 (E.D. Va.
2003) (finding that the Eastern District of Virginia was first in asserting in rem
jurisdiction over the disputed domain name and concluding that the physical location of
the registry in Virginia furnishes sufficient basis to assert in rem jurisdiction even though
the registrar was located in Korea). Although this was an in rem case with a peculiar set
of circumstances, as distinguish from the RDNH hypothesis, it is still relevant to illustrate
the following point: foreign courts’ power to effectuate their decisions is very limited
compared to that of U.S. courts, sitting where registries typically reside. When the door
to a U.S. court is potentially opened before a losing party in a former, foreign proceeding,
that court is not, arguendo, the final arbiter of the dispute.
265
In this case, a mark owner would probably want to sue in Germany, where the mark
is established.

EFRONI FORMAT

78

12/9/2003 2:31 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 14:29

later litigate in the United States, where it would probably lose.266
On the other hand, if you find yourself in the shoes of the City
Council of Barcelona, and you are already compelled to litigate in
a U.S. court under the RDNH provision, your best strategy is
probably to put all your efforts into strenuously objecting to the
U.S. court’s in personam jurisdiction.267 You should do so despite
the fact that you have already submitted to the U.S. court in the
UDRP filing.268 If you fail in the jurisdictional stage, try to assert
some protected rights under the Lanham Act, such as common law
trademark rights.269 Obviously, once in federal court, you are in a
much worse position than your opponent. In fact, in light of the
Barcelona.com decision, you have almost no hope there at all.
3. The Partial Reverse Effect
As mentioned, the UDRP brings the domain name dispute
under the RDNH provision of the ACPA.270 The term “partial
reverse effect” refers to a potential, new trend among owners of
foreign marks to prefer foreign litigation and skip the UDRP
option.271 It is only a “partial” effect because the UDRP remains
attractive to U.S. mark owners. The motivation for the effect is
that the UDRP becomes a trap, possibly forcing owners of foreign
266

Indeed, the Fourth Circuit in Barcelona.com indicated that a possible effect of an
earlier UDRP proceeding would be to bring the dispute under the scope of the RDNH
provision of the ACPA:
[T]he ACPA authorizes a suit by a domain name registrant whose domain name
has been suspended, disabled or transferred under that reasonable policy
(including the UDRP) to seek a declaration that the registrant’s registration and
use of the domain name involves no violation of the Lanham Act as well as an
injunction returning the domain name.
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 625 (emphasis removed). Absent such stage, the RDNH is
probably inapplicable by its own terms.
267
This is assuming that the RDNH provision actually requires this type of territorial
jurisdiction. See supra discussion in Part II.B.3. A subject-matter jurisdiction objection
would probably not be convincing in light of Sallen.
268
The hardship of convincing a court to accept such a problematic assertion is evident
on its face.
269
See, e.g., Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 267–69
(4th Cir. 2003) (providing an overview on common law trademark rights and citing
relevant authorities).
270
See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
271
Especially in light of the litigation hurdles waiting for them in U.S. courts. See
discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
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marks to litigate where they are very likely to lose.272 In other
words, a possible cheap and fast victory under UDRP may lead to
an expensive and extremely risky proceeding in a U.S. court. The
anticipated partial reverse effect might have a substantial adverse
impact on the concept and function of UDRP. A policy that is
attractive only to U.S. mark owners may pose difficult legitimacy
questions.273 In addition, the partial reverse effect may increase
the volume of international domain name litigation, leading to
conflicting decisions and posing a difficult test to the comity
concept as applied by various courts.274 Is sum, a partial reverse
effect is something to avoid and inhibit, especially if one believes
that UDRP was essentially a good idea.
D. The Big Picture and Its Critique
In order to fully grasp the implication of the Barcelona.com
decision, it is necessary to have a broader perspective of other
recent, important case law, creating together the big picture of
cybersquatting law in the United States. Some of the most
troubling issues encountered by courts applying the ACPA in
international domain name disputes were due process, the
extraterritorial effect, and the international comity problems. This
section briefly describes these problems and the ways U.S. courts
dealt with the new challenges.
1. Minimum Contacts Yes or No; What Does Shaffer Really
Mean?
U.S. courts generally found no minimum contacts sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction resulting from mere online presence

272

See id.
Indeed, UDRP legitimacy questions have already bothered commentators and
invoked harsh criticism even without considering the described reverse effect. See, e.g.,
Froomkin, supra note 16 (critiquing the formation and use of ICANN as means to avoid
proper public rulemaking); A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and
AntiTrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (describing economic-competitive aspects of ICANN
functions and its relationship with the U.S. government); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and
the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000).
274
See discussion on international comity infra Part IV.D.3.
273
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of the defendant that could be accessed in that jurisdiction.275
Additionally, minimum contacts generally could not be established
by mere registration of the domain name with a registration
authority located in the jurisdiction.276 Therefore, personal
jurisdiction over alleged cybersquatters was often very hard to
establish.277 The alternative was in rem jurisdiction.278
Part I.B.2 of this Article provided a brief description of the
three types of in rem jurisdiction. The first type is true in rem
jurisdiction, relevant when the action is concerning rights in a res
located in the jurisdiction of plaintiff against the world, i.e., against
Thus, in rem
any potential, non-specified right holder.279
jurisdiction that determines the exclusive rights to use a certain
domain name has a true in rem effect.280 In Shaffer v. Heitner, the
Supreme Court was asked to resolve a question of quasi in rem II
(sometimes called attachment) jurisdiction.281 The Shaffer court
275

See discussion supra Part I.B.1; see also Shri Ram Chandra Mission v.
Sahajmarg.org, 139 F. Supp. 2d 721, 722 (E.D. Va. 2001) (noting the dismissal of the
original in personam action due to lack of minimum contacts with the jurisdiction when
the only contact was mere registration).
276
Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 859 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that
registration of the domain name in Virginia alone was not sufficient to establish
minimum contacts with Virginia for establishing in personam jurisdiction).
277
See discussion supra Part II.B.1; see also Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.com,
51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709–10 (E.D. Va. 1999) (plaintiff in a pre-ACPA case attempted to
bring an in rem action against the domain names instead of an in personam action against
the registrants), vacated due to a superseding statute by Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v.
Allporsche.com, 215 F.3d 1320 (4th Cir. 2000) (table), and remanded in part by Porsche
Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002).
278
See Porsche Cars, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 709–10.
279
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 cmt. a (1982) (noting that in a true in
rem proceeding, but not necessarily in a quasi in rem proceeding, the judgment is binding
even on persons to whom no notice of the proceeding was given).
280
CNN I, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va. 2001) (categorizing a domain name
jurisdiction action as “true in rem,” where the owner of the res need not have minimum
contacts with the forum).
281
433 U.S. 186, 189 (1977). The question there was whether a Delaware statute
allowing in rem jurisdiction through sequestration of Delaware corporation shares owned
by a non-resident defendant in order to compel personal appearance in an unrelated claim
was constitutional. See id. at 189–95. In the case, a shareholder brought a derivative
action against the non-resident shareholder of a Delaware corporation in a matter
unrelated to the rights in the shares. Id. at 189–92. Because the Delaware statute
afforded an in rem action determining the rights of the parties unrelated to the “location”
of the shares, this was a quasi in rem II (or “attachment”) case.
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ruled that the Delaware statute providing attachment jurisdiction
against a non-resident shareholder of a Delaware corporation must
satisfy the minimum contacts standard of due process.282
The controversy over the correct interpretation of Shaffer in the
context of domain names disputes can be reduced to whether the
minimum contacts standard also applies to true in rem
jurisdiction—and thus also to the ACPA in rem provision—or
whether minimum contacts are required solely in quasi in rem II
jurisdictions. Struggling with this question, courts generally have
upheld the ACPA in rem actions even when the rights of a person
having no minimum contacts with the jurisdiction were affected.283
Such application an of the ACPA was justified by viewing as mere
dicta statements in Shaffer which arguably require a more
expansive application of the minimum contacts requirement to
include all types of in rem actions.284
2. The Extraterritorial Effect of the ACPA
An extraterritorial application of domestic trademark law is a
problem, as trademark law is territorial and each sovereign should
be free to provide protection within its territory according to its

282

Id. at 207 (citing Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
See CNN I, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va. 2001). The court stated:
[W]here, as here, the action is properly categorized as “true in rem,” there is no
requirement that the owner or claimant of the res have minimum contacts with
the forum. More particularly, in an ACPA in rem action, it is not necessary that
the allegedly infringing registrant have minimum contacts with the forum; it is
enough, as here, that the registry is located in the forum.
Id. See also CNN II, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 527 (E.D. Va. 2001) (asserting jurisdiction by
virtue of the deposit of the certificate of registration by the registrar with the court as
establishing in rem jurisdiction and taking a narrow reading of Shaffer); Harrods Ltd. v.
Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 225 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding the
constitutionality of the ACPA in rem provision); CNN Appeal, No. 02-1112, 2003 WL
152846, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003) (citing Harrods, 302 F.3d at 225).
284
See, e.g., Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209. The court stated:
Thus, although the presence of the defendant’s property in a State might
suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and the
litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support the State’s
jurisdiction. If those other ties did not exist, cases over which the State is now
thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in that forum.
Id.
283
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own domestic rules.285 The guiding Supreme Court opinion on the
issue of extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act is Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co.286 The Bulova Court, acknowledging the
problematic aspect of applying the Lanham Act in disputes
involving extraterritorial effect, held that such an application was
appropriate only where the infringing activity adversely affects
U.S. commerce.287 In essence, the Bulova decision dictates that
extraterritorial application of U.S. trademark law is appropriate
only when (1) defendant is a U.S. citizen (or has extensive contacts
and presence in the United States); (2) defendant’s conduct (in a
foreign country) affects U.S. commerce; and (3) there is no conflict
between U.S. law and the foreign country’s law as a result of
applying the Lanham Act.288
The relevance of the extraterritorial effect doctrine is evident in
cases of international domain name disputes, where application of
the ACPA has immediate international effects. Clearly, a U.S.
court imposing the ACPA rules in a gTLD dispute determines what
each and every Internet user in the world will see—or will not
see—when clicking the corresponding Internet address. At the
same time, such court has control over the availability of domain
name registrations to foreign actors, regardless of their nationality
or contacts with the U.S. forum. The problem is especially acute
in applying the in rem provision absent of any of the
extraterritoriality doctrine constraints.289
U.S. courts, evaluating the extraterritorial effects of their ruling
in domain name disputes, generally do not consider such effects as
a constraint. For example, the federal court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, in its second opinion in the Cable News Network L.P.

285

See supra Parts I.C.1, IV.B (discussing the territoriality concepts in trademark law).
344 U.S. 280 (1952).
287
See id. at 285–87.
288
See Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642–43 (2d Cir. 1956)
(analyzing Bulova); see also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The Digital Trademark Right: A
Troubling New Extraterritorial Reach of United States Law, 81 N.C. L. REV. 483, 492–
500 (2003) (analyzing Bulova, Vanity Fair, and U.S. jurisprudence regarding
extraterritorial effect doctrine).
289
See Nguyen, supra note 288, at 544–45 (enumerating the extraterritoriality doctrine’s
limitations and noting that none of them exist in the ACPA in rem provision).
286
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v. CNNews.com case (“CNN II”),290 concluded that
<www.cnnnews.com>—a Chinese news Web site which registered
with a Chinese registrar291 that displayed text almost entirely in the
Chinese language, offered no goods for sale outside China, and
was ostensibly directed solely at Internet users outside of the
United States—constituted use in U.S. commerce and affected U.S.
commerce.292 The court’s reasoning for this conclusion was quite
remarkable. First, the court found that the Chinese Web site’s
“effect or impact” on U.S. commerce “results from the global
nature of the Internet.”293 Second, the court concluded that
“‘.com’ is essentially an American top-level domain.”294 Thus, the
Chinese Web site was offering news services in the United States,
and because the Cable News Network (“CNN”) was a famous
mark in America, U.S. commerce was affected.295 The result
suggests that the extraterritoriality doctrine does not stop U.S.
courts from applying the Lanham Act in gTLD registrations.
While one court further expressed the worry that U.S. marks would
290
See CNN II, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001). The district court issued two
opinions in this case, the first of which denied a dismissal and the second of which
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, Cable News Network L.P.
291
After the controversy over the Web site had arisen, but before the plaintiff filed its
complaint, the defendant changed the registrar from NSI, a U.S. firm, to Eastern
Communication Company Ltd., a Chinese registrar. See CNN II, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
292
Id. at 517–18.
293
Id. at 517.
294
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
295
Id. at 517–18. Some other courts followed this approach. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc.
v. Aol.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456 (E.D. Va. 2003). The court stated:
Yet, this is not an “extraterritorial application” of the Lanham Act or the
ACPA, because [Public Interest Registry], the “.org” registry, is located in this
district, and the transfer order would not “specifically enjoin any activity
outside the United States; instead, [the order] would be limited to ordering [the
registry] in this [district] to transfer ownership of [the] domain name.”
Id. (quoting CNN II, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 518 n.29); see also Internet Billions Domains,
Inc. v. Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C., No. 01-5417, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11805 (E.D.
Pa. May 31, 2002). In Internet Billions, the court found that “the mere fact that the
internet allows for worldwide access does not strip an American court of its subject
matter jurisdiction under the Lanham Act over activities directed at the United States.”
Id. at *16. The court continued: “As the ‘.org’ suffix with no country code in the domain
name for a Web site that uses English has been held to target users in the United States,
we find the allegations that [plaintiff’s] activities were directed toward the United States
to be sufficient.” Id. (citing Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racism et
L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001)).
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be infringed without recourse by using foreign registries such as
ccTLD,296 another had the practical advice for foreign registrants
who think that the U.S. process is unfair—register with a ccTLDs
in the first instance.297
3. International Comity Considerations
The extraterritorial effect doctrine is one manifestation of a
more general concept of international comity.298 The fundamental
assumption of comity is the recognition by one legal system
applying its law in its territory of the potential involvement of
interests of other sovereign’s law system.299 A relevant aspect of
comity “ordinarily requires that courts of a separate sovereign not
interfere with concurrent proceedings based on the same transitory
296
See GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 624 (E.D. Va.
2003). The court stated:
[A] desire to avoid United States jurisdiction may cause foreign registrants to
choose to use domain names within their respective country code top-level
domains, whose registries are located in and operated by the foreign countries,
rather than the currently popular ‘generic’ domain names such as “.com” and
“.net.” The result may be an increasing number of domain names registered
out of the reach of United States jurisdiction, but accessible to United States
users through the universal domain name system, which in turn will pose a
serious challenge to the enforcement of United States trademark rights on the
Internet.
Id.
297
See Am. Online, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 457. The court stated that foreign registrants
using the <.org> TLD “chose, in effect, to play Internet ball in American cyberspace.
Had they wished to avoid an American ACPA suit and transfer order and American
jurisdiction altogether, they might have chosen to register the infringing domain name in
top-level domains with solely foreign registries and registrars.” Id.
298
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law observes:
[C]omity has been variously conceived and defined. A well-known definition
is: “Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”
Supra note 19, § 101 cmt. e (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895); see
also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, Supra note 19, § 403 cmt. a.
299
See Guyot, 159 U.S. at 164 (“[Comity] is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
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claim, at least until a judgment is reached in one action.”300 The
practice of extending comity, however, is generally accepted
whenever the foreign court has proper jurisdiction and enforcement
does not prejudice the rights of U.S. citizens or violate U.S. public
policy.301
Courts applying the ACPA in the context of
international domain name disputes often recognize the need for
comity analysis in decisions influencing other sovereigns’ legal
interests—in particular, when the in rem provision was put into
action.302 U.S. courts generally do not consider comity principles a
serious obstacle when applying the ACPA in international domain
name disputes, however.303
One court evaluating the international implication of applying
the in rem provision provided a relatively elaborate comity
discussion. In GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantafe.com, the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia considered
whether it should defer to a previously issued injunction issued by
a Korean court regarding a domain name.304 The court discussed
at length the “Princess Lida” doctrine,305 which provides that in
certain types of in rem actions, the first federal court to assert
jurisdiction excludes other courts’ adjudication.306 Since the
300

Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 939 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
301
V’Soske, Inc. v. Vsoske.com, No. 00 Civ. 6099, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5025, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (citing several Second Circuit authorities).
302
V’Soske, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5025, at *19.
303
See, e.g., CNN Appeal, No. 02-1112, 2003 WL 152846 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003),
(affirming lower court’s finding of jurisdiction without mentioning international comity
concerns); Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 310 F.3d 293, 302–03 (2d Cir. 2002)
(indicating, in dicta, that international comity is not offended by the in rem ACPA
provision, since Congress identified the U.S. registrar or registry of the domain name as
the nexus to the U.S. jurisdiction) (citing H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 14 (1999)); Am.
Online, Inc., v. AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 455–57 (E.D. Va. 2003) (concluding that
international comity does not bar an injunction directed at the <.org> registry to transfer a
domain name when the foreign registrar refuses to cooperate with the court);
GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 626 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(determining that U.S. federal court was not restricted by a prior foreign court order on
the same domain name since the court in Virginia was first to assert jurisdiction, and
since public policy and overriding U.S. interests justify such result).
304
GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 617–26.
305
Id. at 624–25.
306
Id. (citing SEC v. Banner Fund Int’l, 211 F.3d 602, 611 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Al-Abood
v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2000); Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v.
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GlobalSantaFe court found that it was first in time to assert
jurisdiction, it was “not obligated under the rule in Princess Lida to
cede jurisdiction over the domain name in light of the subsequent
order issued by the Korean court.”307 The GlobalSantaFe court
further concluded that comity did not bar the application of the
first-in-time rule under the circumstances.308
The application of a first-in-time rule in the context of the
ACPA in rem provision raises the concern of a consequent
“litigation race” situation, in which parties are encouraged to file
suit before their opponent does. For example, as soon as the cloud
of forthcoming dispute between a U.S. mark owner and a foreign
registrant emerges, and where application of the in rem provision
is in the vicinity, parties improve their position in a subsequent,
indeed inevitable, court litigation, if they are the first to file an
action in a court sitting in their preferred jurisdiction.309 Such a
race may provide a negative incentive for parties considering
whether to turn first to alternative dispute resolution methods. If
international comity and the first-in-time rule are taken seriously
enough to influence litigation strategies, international parties are
more likely to elect court litigation and are likely to choose it
earlier.
4. The ACPA Laundry Machine Effect and Its Paradox
The problems discussed above regarding application of the
ACPA in international domain name disputes were especially
pertinent to the in rem provision. U.S. courts did not consider
those problems as a bar to their application of the ACPA in
Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 465–66 (1939)). Although originally developed in the context
of federalism, this doctrine has since been applied to federal cases with parallel
proceedings underway in another country. Id. at 625 (citing Banner Fund, 211 F.3d at
611; Dailey v. Nat’l Hockey League, 987 F.2d 172, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1993)).
307
GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
308
See id. at 626 (finding that (i) U.S. and Korean proceedings were not concurrent; (ii)
the Korean court proceeding was intended to frustrate the enforcement of a subsequent
order of the U.S. court; (iii) enforcing the U.S. judgment is supported by significant U.S.
public policy interests).
309
Such “litigation race” scenario contemplates a potential in rem action in the United
States filed by the mark owner against some type of declaratory judgment action filed by
the actual registrant in a foreign country, attempting to establish his or her rights in using
the domain name.

EFRONI FORMAT

2003]

12/9/2003 2:31 PM

BETTER MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN DISPUTES

87

difficult cases. Some commentators have raised serious concerns
regarding this trend, however. They have argued that the in rem
provision, as applied, is unconstitutional as violating due
process,310 that the extraterritorial reach of the ACPA is
unreasonable under principles of international law prescriptive
jurisdiction,311 that certain applications of the ACPA raise
troubling questions concerning the overreaching of U.S. courts,312
and that the ACPA is violates comity principles.313 Without the
need to address the merits of those assertions, this Article
introduces another troubling aspect of the ACPA—its RDNH
provision. The Sallen court teaches that any mark, U.S. or foreign,
may be subject to the RDNH provision once a UDRP losing
registrant exercises it.314 The Barcelona.com court, however,
teaches that only owners of U.S. marks may successfully defend
the domain names in a RDNH action in U.S. courts.315 In such
cases, the ACPA becomes a clearinghouse, or a laundry machine,
of foreign trademark rights in domain name disputes. Considering
that the vast majority of UDRP challenges are commenced in U.S.
courts,316 this is a serious problem indeed. Such a result is likely to
encourage forum shopping in international domain name disputes,
a trend that is already facilitated by the UDRP Rules.317
In some respects, the RDNH laundry machine effect is much
more problematic than the in rem provision. In order to succeed in
an in rem action, the plaintiff-mark-owner electing to sue in the
United States must first establish the likelihood of confusion or
310

Struve & Wagner, supra note 11, at 1006–18 (analyzing Shaffer as referring to all
types of in rem jurisdictions and concluding that the ACPA in rem provision, lacking the
requirement of minimum contacts, is unconstitutional).
311
Nguyen, supra note 288, at 552.
312
Bhanu K. Sadasivan, Jurisprudence Under the In Rem Provision of the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 237, 255 (2003).
313
See Steven J. Coran, Note, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act’s In
Rem Provision: Making American Trademark Law the Law of the Internet?, 30 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 169, 194–95 (2001).
314
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Sallen ruling).
315
See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s Barcelona.com ruling).
316
Efroni, supra note 24, at 367 & n.200 (finding that until late 2002 more than ninetyfour percent of all court challenged UDRP decisions were commenced in the United
States).
317
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing UDRP rule 3(xiii)(b)).
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dilution and that the domain name was used in U.S. commerce.318
Conversely, a registrant suing a foreign mark owner in a U.S. court
under the RDNH provision must only show (1) registration; (2)
suspension, disablement, or transfer of the registration in
accordance with dispute resolution policy; (3) notice; and (4) that
the plaintiff’s registration or use of the domain name is not
unlawful under the Lanham Act.319 This burden of proof is light,
especially if the owner is trying to avoid application of the Lanham
Act by asserting no use in U.S. commerce at all.320 By definition,
foreign marks are generally not protected by the Lanham Act; thus,
owners of foreign marks have no defense but to try to assert U.S.
trademark rights through use in U.S. commerce.
This Article takes the above assertion one step further: the
laundry machine effect is inevitable, hopelessly rooted in the
ACPA as a statute that regulates international cybersquatting
disputes according to domestic trademark law. For example, the
defendant, a foreign mark owner, challenged the court’s subject
matter jurisdiction in the Sallen case, arguing that the RDNH
provision applied only to U.S. registered marks.321 The court, in
turn, correctly pointed out that such reading of the statute would
bring about absurd results, leaving registrants unprotected against
reverse domain name hijackers so long as the hijackers are not
registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.322
Thus, out of the two possible alternatives, the court chose the
only one that is logically and reasonably acceptable. In the
Barcelona.com case, the court was asked to ascertain the scope of
the RDNH provision, namely under which circumstances a losing
registrant is protected under this provision.323 Again, the court
318

See supra note 235 (noting that in order to succeed in an in rem action, plaintiff must
establish infringement or dilution claims in accordance with regular Lanham Act
requirements).
319
See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the Barcelona.com court’s interpretation of the
RDNH provision).
320
See supra note 260 and accompanying text (noting that this was exactly the theory of
the city council in the Barcelona.com case and a prominent reason for its failure to obtain
the domain name).
321
Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2001).
322
Id. at 25; see also supra text accompanying notes 173–79.
323
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d 617, 623–29 (4th Cir. 2003).
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faced two possible, alternative readings—registration must not
violate only the Lanham Act, or, it must not violate any relevant
trademark law involved. And again, the court upheld the reading
that is not only compatible with the plain language of the ACPA
and with trademark territoriality principles, but also the only
logically and reasonably acceptable alternative.324 As mentioned
earlier, the opposite reading would mean that under the ACPA,
U.S. courts adjudicating RDNH actions should determine
trademark rights protected by any possible relevant jurisdiction.325
Unfortunately, the Sallen and the Barcelona.com decisions
remain logical and reasonable only when they stand alone. The
combination of the two results in the above-mentioned laundry
machine effect. Even under the assumption that the RDNH
provision requires meeting U.S. constitutional personal jurisdiction
tests,326 and even underestimating the effect of the UDRP Rules in
helping registrants to establish such jurisdiction, the result for the
owners of foreign marks is still very harsh. Considering the
arguable expansion of U.S. personal jurisdiction rules in the digital
age,327 the result may be not only harsh but also probable. It
should be difficult to justify such a system as meeting the standard
of “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”328

E. Possible Foreign Reactions
In the “White Paper,”329 a statement of policy published by the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(“NTIA”), the U.S. executive branch explicitly recognized the
need for international cooperation in regulating and controlling the

324

See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Barcelona.com holding and the court’s
determination that Spanish law is inapplicable).
325
See supra Part IV.A (analyzing the Barcelona.com holding).
326
See supra text accompanying notes 178–83 (arguing that this question is still rather
open).
327
See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing in personam jurisdiction).
328
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
329
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, Statement of Policy, 63 Fed. Reg.
31,741, 31,746 (June 10, 1998) [hereinafter White Paper].
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DNS.330 The ACPA, however, is an example of a combined U.S.
legislative and the U.S. judiciary activism, which leads to a de
facto, unilateral Internet regulation. Such activism might be
conceived as an intimidating message sent to other Internet
nations, with implications that go far beyond private domain name
disputes.
It is reasonable to assume that U.S. treatment of international
domain name disputes may invoke a strong reaction among foreign
countries.
One possible development could be that other
sovereigns would enact their own anticybersquatting legislation.331
The second possible development hypothesized by commentators
was the scenario of “segmentation” of the Internet, as a result of a
power struggle between America and other sovereigns.332 Under
330

For example, in paragraph 11 thereof, the White Paper states: “The U.S. Government
believes that the Internet is a global medium and that its technical management should
fully reflect the global diversity of Internet users. We recognize the need for and fully
support mechanisms that would ensure international input into the management of the
domain name system. In withdrawing the U.S. Government from DNS management and
promoting the establishment of a new, non-governmental entity to manage Internet names
and addresses [a function that now ICANN fulfills], a key U.S. Government objective has
been to ensure that the increasingly global Internet user community has a voice in
decisions affecting the Internet’s technical management.” White Papers, supra note 329.
This aspect of the U.S. approach was sometimes called the “hands off” policy, assuring
no direct, unilateral/governmental regulation of the DNS, at least not in the technical
sense.
331
At least in Japan, this is no longer mere possibility. The recently amended Unfair
Competition Prevention Law (“UCPL”) provides in article 2(1)(xii) a new
anticybersqatting
cause
of
action.
See
Brent
Yonehara,
LANDOFTHERISINGSUN.CO.JP: A Review of Japan’s Protection of Domain Names
Against Cybersquatting, 43 IDEA 207, 221–24 (2003). The amended UCPL defines as
actionable unfair competition “[t]he act of acquiring rights or preserving the right to use a
domain name that is identical or similar to the indication of another person’s particular
product (i.e., the name, trade name, trademark mark or other indication of goods or
services of another person’s) for the purpose of gaining unfair profits or causing harm to
another.” Id. at 221–22; see also Yamasaki Law Office, New Developments in Japanese
Law: Trademark Issues on the Internet in Japan, at http://www.yamasakilaw.com/practice_5.htm#r5 (Aug. 30, 2001) (describing purpose of the Amendment).
332
See Struve & Wagner, supra note 11, at 1032–34. Describing the phenomenon of
segmentation, the authors state:
Segmentation arises when the various root server systems in use are either in
conflict, or do not accurately reflect the content of other root servers . . .
resulting in, for example, a request for www.yahoo.com yielding a different
web page in different networks . . . .
We predict that segmentation would result under the following circumstances:
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this scenario, countries with enough resources, expertise,
technology, and motivation would create a parallel Internet
infrastructure with an alternative, competing domain name
system.333 If and when such a development occurs, it is likely to
result in a considerable reduction of benefits to Internet users, and
probably a radical change in the status of the Internet as a prime
source of information.334 These two possible types of reactions are
likely to bring more harm than good, both to the United States and
other Internet nations. The apprehension and frustration felt by
other countries as a result of the current situation are indeed very
real, and are likely to grow as U.S. interference with foreign
trademark rights intensifies.335
V. A PROPOSAL FOR A BETTER MODEL: THE INTERNATIONAL
ANTICYBERSQUATTING TREATY
This part consists of four sections. Section A highlights the
problems of a unilateral approach to cybersquatting regulation and
adjudication such as the one manifested in the ACPA. Section B
presents a detailed alternative, a multilateral approach manifested
in an international cybersquatting treaty scheme (“IACT”), which
is based on ten fundamental principles. Section C tests the
First, a new root server system . . . could create conflicts with the existing
public root server system . . . .
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, segmentation must be considered
a potential response by one or more sovereigns to any others’ attempts to exert
unwanted regulatory influence over the domain name system . . . .
....
As should be easily apparent, segmentation of the domain name system would
dramatically decrease its value to the Internet user community.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
333
See id.
334
Id. at 1034. One possible consequence of such segmentation is that it would no
longer be possible to universally rely on any Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) as a
source of reference, since the same Internet address might randomly yield different
results. See id.
335
See Christopher P. Rains, Comment, A Domain by Any Other Name: Forging
International Solutions for the Governance of Internet Domain Names, 14 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 355, 371 (2000) (noting the implications of imposing a single’s nation law on all
Internet-faring nations go largely unnoticed among U.S. policymakers and how the
frustration felt by foreign plaintiffs—and indeed foreign courts—is very real).
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proposed model using two methods; first it applies the
Barcelona.com dispute in a world governed by the proposed IACT,
examines the expected outcome, and compares it with the actual
outcome in that case. Second, it provides a more general gametheory model that proves the assertions of forum shopping
motivation and the advantages of the new scheme over the present
one. Section D argues that the proposed model should be attractive
and advantageous both to the United States and other Internet
nations. While doing so, it examines some possible weaknesses of
the proposed model and offers some answers.
A. Unilateral Approach: A Lose-Lose Situation
If other nations react to the United States’ current policy by
enacting their own domestic cybersquatting laws, the situation may
only get worse. A growth in the number of conflicting decisions
regarding the same dispute in different national courts would have
grave consequences on legal certainty, fairness, and international
comity, and thus should be strongly discouraged.336 In addition, it
is questionable whether such laws would have a significant effect
on disputes that arguably involve U.S. public policy interests.337
As noted earlier, U.S. courts have already demonstrated an
aggressive enforcement approach, ordering registries and a
registrar to effectuate their decisions.338 The fact that the registries
of all major, unrestricted gTLDs are located on U.S. soil339 makes
336

After the anti-cybersquatting bill passed the House of Representatives, Clinton White
House spokesman Joe Lockhart stated, “We believe that fundamentally we’d be walking
down the wrong road if we legislated a cybersquatting law and then the 200 or so Internet
countries around the world started legislating their own rules and laws.” Statement by Joe
Lockhart, White House Press Secretary (Oct. 28, 1999), noted in Springer, supra note 8,
at 359 & n.281.
337
See, e.g., V’Soske, Inc. v. Vsoske.com, No. 00 Civ. 6099, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5025, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (concluding that even when another foreign court
may properly assert jurisdiction over a dispute, it does not prejudice the rights of U.S.
citizens or violate domestic public policy).
338
See CNN II, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001); see also supra note 295 and
accompanying text (describing recent U.S. case law finding overriding U.S. interests in
applying the ACPA to international disputes); supra notes 152–53 and accompanying
text (describing U.S. courts’ enforcement measures against registration authorities in
order to give effect to their rulings).
339
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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a conflicting foreign legal process in many cases unenforceable,
and indeed, meaningless.340 Put differently, a U.S. injunction
against the gTLD registry has proven to be stronger then any
conflicting foreign law or judicial order.341 Indeed, since physical
control over Internet infrastructure does matter,342 U.S. courts are
potentially the final arbiters in many cybersquatting disputes.343
Moreover, it is likely that legislation of foreign
anticybersquatting laws regulating gTLD registrations, if and when
it comes,344 would be as problematic as the ACPA and suffer from
similar symptoms. These laws would probably afford effective
protection to marks recognized by the relevant national trademark
law, and at the same time, afford little, if any, protection to
cybersquatted marks that the national law does not protect. Such a
result occurred in the case of the ACPA as applied in the
340
See GlobalSanteFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 626–27 (E.D.
Va. 2003) (issuing an injunction against the <.com> registry to enforce its judgment and
disable the domain name until it is transferred to the mark owner, despite a Korean
court’s order telling the Korean registrar not to do so); see also Am. Online, Inc. v.
Aol.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 457 (E.D. Va. 2003) (issuing an injunction against the
<.org> registry to enforce the transfer of the domain name to the mark owner when the
foreign registrar refused to cooperate with the court).
341
Id.
342
Struve & Wagner, supra note 11 at 992–93. The authors observe that the regulatory
authority of a sovereign with the principal infrastructure of the domain name system
located in its territory “can be grounded in either the widely-accepted principles of
prescriptive jurisdiction or the de facto result of the physical location of elements of the
domain name system.” Id. at 992. The authors continue:
In the prescriptive jurisdiction case, the location of certain elements,
specifically the root or TLD servers, within a sovereign’s territory will in
almost all cases provide at least substantial international legal support for the
assertion of jurisdiction . . . de facto control can be exerted via the reality of the
technology and geography. In either event, the same basic point holds:
geography matters.
Id. at 992–93 (footnote omitted). In these contexts, geography matters not only as a
prescriptive jurisdiction element, but also regarding jurisdiction to enforce. See supra
note 21.
343
Nguyen, supra note 288, at 535–40 (warning against the formation of an in rem court
by default in the Eastern District of Virginia, resulting from the fact that major gTLD
registries are located there).
344
For example, see supra note 331 (noting the new Japanese anticybersqatting
provision). Japan’s law probably protects against cybersquatting in gTLDs in addition to
<.jp> domains, albeit protection is based on different principles than in the United States.
See Yonehara, supra note 331, at 221–24 (2003) (describing Japan’s protection against
cybersquatting and comparing it to the ACPA).

EFRONI FORMAT

94

12/9/2003 2:31 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 14:29

Barcelona.com ruling, and such a result should be avoided instead
of replicated.
An interesting question is whether foreign mark owners should
take the advice offered by the Eastern District of Virginia. In two
recent decisions, this court used language that suggested ccTLD
registrations enjoyed ACPA immunity.345
Further, ccTLD
registrations are not subject to the compulsory UDRP, unless
voluntarily adopting it.346 Can ccTLD registrations solve the
problem of international domain name disputes? Probably not.347
The fact that ccTLD registries are subject to regulation and control
of the corresponding national governments is a matter of mere U.S.
government courtesy.348 There in no guarantee against the
following scenario: one day, the U.S Department of Commerce
concludes that certain ccTLD registrations are posing serious
threats to U.S. interests. Therefore, ICANN is delegated the
responsibility to make sure that U.S. interests, including trademark
rights, are not infringed through such registrations.349 Though it
could be argued that such a scenario is very unlikely, it is still
technically possible. A careful reading of some of recent U.S.
court decisions may be regarded as an implied call by the courts
for putting order in the unruly ccTLD system.350
More
importantly, in the context of the RDNH provision, this solution is
345

See supra note 296–97 and accompanying text.
Sharrock, supra note 17, at 841–42 (noting that ccTLD registrars are not required to
bind their registrants to the UDRP, although country code registration authorities can
voluntarily adopt the policy).
347
This issue may require a more comprehensive discussion. The Article, however,
only touches upon some arguments indicating that ccTLD registrations as a
comprehensive solution is inadequate.
348
See von Arx & Hagen, supra note 4, ¶ 20. The authors observe:
Technically, the ccTLDs are subdomains of the “root domain” created by the
U.S. government and “contained” in the root zone file. Despite the U.S.
reservation of technical control over the A root, the U.S. government states that
“[n]ational governments now have, and will continue to have, authority to
manage or establish policy for their own ccTLDs,” thereby attempting to
downplay the influence that the U.S. may indirectly have over the policies of
nations foreign to the U.S.
Id. (footnote omitted).
349
See id. The U.S. control over the A root server provides the power to create,
redelegate, or destroy ccTLDs. See id. ¶ 2.
350
See supra note 296.
346
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meaningless.
Foreign mark owners never chose gTLD
registrations in such cases—the registrant did. In fact, the foreign
owner may have neither gTLD nor ccTLD registrations, yet still be
forced to submit to ACPA rules in U.S. courts.
B. Possible Solution: The IACT
The discussion thus far suggests that the evil is rooted in the
national/unilateral approach to cybersquatting regulation and
adjudication. The first clear example for the inadequacy of this
approach is, of course, the ACPA itself. The IACT offers an
alternative. A draft of the IACT would be prepared by an
international organization with recognized specialty, experience,
and reputation, such as WIPO. Such a treaty shall be signed by all
nations wishing to become “member states” and willing to adhere
to its principles.
The important IACT fundamentals are
summarized by the following ten principles:
(1) Domestic Legislation: All member states must legislate
within a certain timeframe domestic anticybersqutting laws
protecting against abusive registrations of domain names
incorporating trademarks.351 The heart of this legislation
would be a cybersquatting standard that must not be lower
than the “minimum standard” stipulated in the IACT.352
This law should also include a RDNH provision, protecting
registrants against unjustified claims, an in rem

351

An example of implementing international intellectual property standards through
domestic legislation by member-states can be found in articles 44–49 of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. See Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994);
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. For congressional approval of
the TRIPS and WTO Agreements, see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103465, 101-103, 108 Stat. 4809, 4814-19 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 17,
19, and 35 U.S.C.). See also J.H. Reichman, Comment, Enforcing the Enforcement
Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 335, 340–41 (1997) (describing
the relevant implementation and enforcement articles of the TRIPS Agreement).
352
See infra text accompanying note 355 (discussing principle 2).
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provision,353 and other essential features of effective
anticybersquatting legislation.354
(2) Minimum Standard: The IACT shall stipulate an
agreed-upon
minimum
standard
for
unlawful
cybersquatting. A member state should be allowed, if it
deems appropriate, to incorporate a higher standard in its
domestic legislation (i.e., a wider range of Internet
activities would fall under the definition of unlawful
cybersquatting).
No standard lower than the IACT
minimum standard shall be permitted, however.355
(3) Mutual Protection: All member states should be obliged
to protect against cybersquatting marks recognized and
protected by any other member state. In a cybersquatting
dispute involving a mark protected under the other member
state’s law, a member state generally should adjudicate the
cybersquatting dispute in accordance with its own domestic
anticybersquatting norms, and under the assumption that
the mark is valid and protectable.
(4) Judicial Assistance: In order to determine whether there
is a protected foreign mark, or “IACT mark,” involved,
member states shall create a system of “judicial assistance.”
353

A recommended in rem provision should establish jurisdiction only in cases in which
the registrant cannot be found or identified. Due to the conceptually elastic of
interpretation of where exactly the physical location of a domain name is, making it
eligible for in rem actions, contracting member states may reach an acceptable definition
of the appropriate adjudicating forum in those instances. In any event, as suggested in
principle 10, the International Anticybersquatting Treaty (“IACT”) generally provides
personal jurisdiction when the opponent is identified and connected to some other
member state. This provision should cover the vast majority of disputes in the first place.
354
The assumption is that member states have already at least minimal trademark
protection in place, and that such states adhere to universally accepted concepts of fair
judicial process and commitment to the rule of law.
355
A prominent example of such an attempt to ascertain internationally accepted
minimum standard against cybersquatting was demonstrated in WIPO’s final report to
ICANN, in the spirit of which the UDRP was crafted. See WIPO, FINAL REPORT OF THE
WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS ¶¶ 170–77 (1999) (defining abusive
registration) [hereinafter WIPO FINAL REPORT], available at http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/report/finalreport.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003). But see Helfer &
Dinwoodie, supra note 101, at 168–70 (questioning the authority and legitimacy of
WIPO to create the standards embodied in the final report).
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In a situation described in principle 3 above and in any
other instance where foreign trademark rights should be
ascertained, the “adjudicating court,” or the court where the
complaint is filed, would submit a query to a proper court
in the jurisdiction where the mark arguably is protected, the
“assisting court.” The query shall be in a standard format
and limited in scope. It should ask the assisting court one
question, and one question only: whether the arguably
cybersquatted mark is protected by law in the assisting
court’s jurisdiction.
(5) Determination of IACT Mark: A final judicial
determination of the assisting court shall be decisive on the
matter of whether the mark constitutes an IACT mark and
whether if falls within the scope of the IACT’s authority.356
(6) Choice of Law I: If (i) a plaintiff-mark-owner files an
IACT action in a court in a member state different from the
member state under which law the mark is arguably
protected, as opposed to the “state of origin” (i.e., where
the mark is protected); and (ii) the standard for
cybersquatting protection in the adjudicating court is higher
than the standard in the state of origin, then the lower
standard of the two should be applied.357
356

A possible appeal procedure may also be considered in this context. Under such a
procedure, the aggrieved party would be able to appeal to a higher court in the assisting
court’s jurisdiction. In such a case, the final judicial finding in that jurisdiction would be
decisive.
357
Here, a mark owner is choosing a forum that does not protect the mark in its
domestic legislation. Such a rule is important to prevent forum shopping of mark owners,
suing in the member state with the highest standard of protection. In case that a mark is
arguably protected in more that one member state, two situations should be regulated: (1)
the mark is arguably protected both in the adjudication court and in other member states;
(2) the mark is arguably protected only in some other multiple member states. In the
former situation, the better rule is that the adjudication court’s standard would apply
(even in a case in which the standards in the other jurisdictions are lower). The rationale
is to allow a mark owner who files an action in a jurisdiction where the mark is protected
to enjoy the domestic cybersquatting protection standard. In the latter situation, the
lowest standard involved should be compared with the adjudication court’s standard, and
the lower between the two should be applied. The aim here is to discourage a mark
owner from filing an action in a jurisdiction where the mark is not protected in an attempt
to benefit from its higher protection standard.
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(7) Choice of Law II: If (i) a plaintiff-registrant who lost a
domain name registration in a UDRP or other similar
proceeding brings an RDNH complaint in an adjudicating
court residing in a jurisdiction different from the state of
origin; and (ii) the standard of the adjudicating court is
lower than the standard of the state of origin, then the
higher standard of protection should apply.358
(8) Choice of Law III: Regarding the factual determination
of which standard is higher and which standard should be
applied in a specific case, the adjudicating court shall have
sole discretion.359
(9) First in Time, First in Right: If the adjudicating court
determines that both parties have cognizant rights in the
mark under any of the trademark laws involved (i.e., both
have a protected IACT mark), then “first in time, first in
right” rule should apply.360 If only one party establishes
rights in an IACT mark, however, the adjudication court
shall render the appropriate judgment securing that party’s
rights in the corresponding domain name.361
(10) Uniform Personal Jurisdiction Rule: The domestic
legislation should also include a special uniform personal
jurisdiction rule. This rule should generally provide an
adjudicating court with personal jurisdiction over a
358

The same rationales and considerations discussed in principle 6 also are relevant in
this situation, with necessary adjustments. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
This rule encourages filing of RDNH actions in jurisdiction(s) where the mark is a
protected, as opposed to the Barcelona.com situation. Conversely, if registrants wish to
avoid litigation in a foreign country (in cases where the protecting jurisdictions are
different than their country of residence), the door is still open to file the action anywhere
else subject to principle 10, but they compromise for a higher standard of cybersquatting
protection.
359
One might suggest the establishment of an appellate panel comprised of international
experts, to which an aggrieved party may appeal only on this issue of applicable
cybersquatting standard under the IACT rules.
360
Namely, the registrant gets to keep the domain name registration. .
361
In order to enforce the adjudicating court’s decision vis-à-vis registration authorities,
is seems that close cooperation with ICANN would be necessary. In addition, an
ancillary rule of res judicata should be installed, giving the adjudicating court’s decision a
binding power in any of the other member state
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defendant (either a mark owner or registrant) in a domain
name dispute filed under the IACT. A defendant in such an
IACT complaint filed in a proper venue in one of the
member states shall be barred from bringing a personal
jurisdiction objection.362
In sum, the idea of the IACT is rather simple: the IACT creates
a new legal and conceptual creature: the IACT mark. Such mark
would be a protected trademark under at least one member state’s
law, but protected against cybersquatting in all member state
jurisdictions.363

362

A proliferated “proper venue” rule should be articulated in the IACT. A proposed
rule could be the following four-level priority scheme: (1) if the jurisdiction where the
mark is protected and where defendant is a resident (or where personal jurisdiction can be
otherwise obtained according to the regular domestic rules) is the same jurisdiction, then
plaintiff should sue there; (2) if these jurisdictions are different, then plaintiff should sue
where the defendant resides (or where personal jurisdiction is otherwise available), unless
plaintiff is able to establish minimum contacts of defendant with the member state where
the mark is protected, upon such case plaintiff may alternatively sue there (the test may
be based on the U.S. minimum contacts concept or a similar one); (3) if neither of the
above two rules apply, then plaintiff should sue where minimum contacts of the
defendant with the member state’s jurisdiction exist; (4) if plaintiff sues in a member
state where defendant is not a resident (and personal jurisdiction is not available), where
the mark is not protected, and where minimum contacts do not exist, then that member
state should nevertheless adjudicate the dispute upon a satisfactory explanation of the
reason for suing there and upon determination that the venue was not chosen in bad faith.
When plaintiff follows this rule, principle 10 should secure personal jurisdiction. In the
appropriate cases, courts may use the forum non conveniens doctrine in order to transfer
suits to a more suitable forum.
363
In a recent article, Professor Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and Professor Jane C. Ginsburg
presented a detailed proposal for a draft of convention on intellectual property matters
(“Draft”). See Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in
Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.—KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002). That proposal for an
international convention was specifically intended to include also domain name disputes.
Id. at 1074 (the text of article 1 of the Draft specifically includes “claims involving
domain names.”). The jurisdictional and adjudication solutions presented in the draft,
however, are significantly different from the solution proposed by the IACT. First, the
Draft is intended also to cover myriad of intellectual property matters such as copyrights,
neighboring rights, trademarks, unfair competition, and more. See id. Second, the Draft
is intended to cover disputes regarding violations occurring not only on the Internet but
also in the off-line world. See id. The Draft contains no language that restricts its scope
only to on-line infringements. Therefore, an instrument such as the IACT mark of which
protection is limited only in the domain-names-incorporating-trademarks context would
be inapplicable.
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C. Testing the Model
1. Applying Barcelona.com in an IACT Legal Framework
After introducing the model, the Article now turns to examine
what result in the Barcelona.com case would have been in an
IACT world. Assume that both the United States and Spain are
member states of the hypothetical IACT. Assume further that both
legislated essentially similar anticybersquatting laws as mandated
by the IACT. The City Council of Barcelona files and wins a
UDRP proceeding, where it asserted its trademark rights under
Spanish law in the term Barcelona. The registrants now seek
reversal and contemplate where to file a RDNH complaint. If they
sue in Spain, then the Spanish court would typically have to decide
first whether the term Barcelona is a protected mark in Spain and
whether the rights in the mark belong to the City Council. If the
court rules in the affirmative in both questions, then the court
should further apply the Spanish anticybersquatting law and
determine whether the registration of the domain name violated
that law.
Alternatively, the registrants may decide to sue in a U.S. court
under the modified ACPA.364 According to the IACT definitions
the U.S. court would be the adjudicating court, and the Spanish
court would be the assisting court. First, the U.S. court should be
able to have in personam jurisdiction over the City Council, in
accordance with principle 10.365 After concluding that the term
Barcelona is not protected under U.S. law,366 a query to the proper
court in Spain should be submitted, where the Spanish trademark
rights in the term shall be ascertained under Spanish law. If the
Spanish court determines the existence of such rights, the U.S.
364

That is, an ACPA that is accommodated to comply with the IACT scheme described
above.
365
See supra note 362 and accompanying text (discussing principle 10). Defendant (the
city council) is not a U.S. resident, the mark is not protected there, and it is also possible
that there are no minimum contacts between the city and the United States. Alternative 4,
however, in the sliding scale described in supra note 362 may nevertheless provide
jurisdiction, by virtue of the IACT agreement.
366
This conclusion is reached for the same reasons delineated in the actual
Barcelona.com decision. See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
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court shall proceed to adjudicate the dispute according to the
modified ACPA under the assumption that the mark is protected.
If no such Spanish trademark rights are established, the registrants
should keep the domain name without the need to further discuss
cybersquatting allegations.
Consequently, the result should be identical, regardless of
whether the registrants elect to sue in a U.S. or Spanish court.367
Thereby, the problems of forum shopping and the frustration felt
by owners of foreign marks sued in the United States would be
essentially eliminated. Even if some of the basic assumptions are
changed—for instance, that the cybersquatting standards are
different in Spain compared to those in the United States—the
applicable law would still be the higher standard of
cybersquatting.368 That means that losing registrants in the UDRP
proceeding would no longer have a more attractive forum that
would entertain their RDNH claim. Even in more internationally
complex circumstances, the result would be essentially similar.
The incentives to forum shop for the venue applying the most
favorable law, both by registrants and mark owners, would
dramatically decrease.369 Another advantage of this scheme is that
a qualified Spanish court would decide on matters of Spanish
trademark law, instead of a U.S. court in Virginia, struggling with
Spanish
trademark
terminology,
legal
analysis
and
interpretation.370
367

Actually, it would not really matter whether registrants alternatively elect to sue in a
third member state’s court. Under the Barcelona.com circumstances, it would always be
Spanish law determining the existence of the mark and the adjudicating court’s
cybersquatting standard applied, unless the circumstances call for application of the
Spanish standard, where principal 7 is applicable.
368
See supra note 357.
369
A more complex hypothetical situation could be, for instance, a Korean registrant
arguably cybersquatting on a Chinese mark using a Japanese registrar. Assuming that all
three jurisdictions adhere to the IACT, the rights in the mark would be determined in the
three possible adjudicating courts according to Chinese law under a cybersquatting
standard least favorable to the plaintiff or the standard of the “state of origin” (in this
case, China). If trademark rights of both parties can be established (e.g., the registrant
has rights under the law of Japan and the mark owner established Chinese rights), then
principle 9 applies; the registrant who was first to register his mark would be allowed to
keep the domain name.
370
The district court in the Barcelona.com dispute put itself in the shoes of a Spanish
court, discussed Spanish trademark law, and made judicial findings applying that law.
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2. The Game Theory Model
Thus far, the Article contests that the ACPA RDNH provision
unreasonably favors U.S. marks, namely, because only such marks
have an effective defense against RDNH claims in U.S. courts. As
a consequence, the Article envisions some negative effects,
including forum shopping, where owners of foreign marks are
motivated to avoid U.S. forum while registrants are strongly
encouraged to file RDNH actions against such owners in U.S.
courts.
The following numerical model examines the ACPA from a
more general perspective, which is not limited to RDNH cases.
While also scrutinizing the ACPA in light of its in personam and in
rem provisions, the model attempts to show the general imbalanced
structure of the ACPA, which facilitates a plaintiff-sensitive forum
shopping situation.371
In the aftermath of the Sallen and the Barcelona.com decisions,
it appears that judicial outcomes in international cybersquatting
disputes litigated in U.S. courts are becoming more predictable.
Hence, under this model, numerical values are assigned to different
world situations or scenarios.
There are two types of rational actors participating in any
situation evaluated by the model: registrant (R) and mark owner
(MO). Similar to other typical behavioral models, this model
assumes that both actors aspire to maximize their utility and make
informed decisions accordingly.
In addition, this model
contemplates three variables:
(1) Venue: The two possible alternatives are either the
United States or Jurisdiction X.

See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 189 F. Supp. 2d
367, 371–72 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d and vacated, 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2002)
371
Since registrants as plaintiffs will always attempt to bring RDNH actions, while
owners as plaintiffs will exercise the in personam and in rem provisions, the general
model also includes the RDNH problem.
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(2) Applicable Trademark Law: The two possible
alternatives are either U.S. law or Jurisdiction X law.372
(3) Plaintiff: The two possible alternatives are (i) R filing a
RDNH action after losing its registration in the UDRP (or
through application of a similar policy);373 or (ii) MO filing
a trademark infringement or dilution action.374
When the mark in question is likely to be protected in the
venue’s jurisdiction375 then the symbol (TM+) is assigned, as
opposed to situations where the mark is not protected (TM–).
The model further assumes that a plaintiff suing in a certain
venue would make three types of arguments: (1) the chosen venue
has personal jurisdiction (PJR) over the defendant;376 (2) the
chosen venue has subject matter jurisdiction (SMJ) to adjudicate
372

Trademark law in this context includes both substantive trademark protection—that
is, general definitions of protected marks and circumstances under which protection is
triggered—and protection against cybersquatting.
373
For purposes of convenience, the model further refers only to the UDRP. The
analysis, however, should apply also to any other policy falling under the RDNH
provision of the ACPA.
374
Arguably, these are not the only possible world situations. For example, registrant
(R) may try to secure a declaratory judgment through a “preemptive lawsuit” before mark
owner (MO) takes any measures. The model argues, however, that this situation would
be very rare. The first reason is the immediate, substantial litigation costs involved.
Rational R would try to avoid litigation absent an imminent threat to the registration.
Even if MO files a UDRP complaint, there is still hope that R would win the UDRP
proceeding. Thus, it makes no sense for R to be inpatient at this early stage. Second,
such an action would prevent R from implementing litigation strategies, in the relevant
situation, that would help R in directing subsequent judicial proceedings to R’s favorite
jurisdiction. R filing a preemptive lawsuit is generally confined to a jurisdiction where
personal jurisdiction over MO is available. Third, R filing a “preemptive lawsuit” is
expected to have a significant cause of action problem. Even the Sallen holding is not
directly applicable where a subsequent UDRP proceeding never took place. Fourth,
being the first to bring a lawsuit does not seem to furnish R with a significant strategic
advantage. But see supra Part IV.D.3 (discussing the GlobalSantaFe case and indicating
that in some cases of possible in rem actions in the United States, it might be important
for R to sue first in order to overcome comity problems). In sum, a “preemptive lawsuit”
strategy in general is likely to be very unattractive for R, hence negligible for the purpose
of the model.
375
This is the case, for example, when an official trademark registration exists and
maintained by MO.
376
Since the model assumes international elements and interests involved in the dispute,
it is likely that defendant would bring also a personal jurisdiction challenge.
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the dispute;377 and; (3) plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought
(Merits).378 In addition, the model assigns numerical values to
each scenario: the value 1 is assigned when the plaintiff is likely to
succeed in the argument, the value 0 is assigned when the plaintiff
is likely not to succeed and the value 0.5 is assigned when the
plaintiff may succeed. Utility value (UV) is the sum value in all
three arguments in a certain situation, while the aggregate value of
the UVs in any one of the venues is the total utility value (TUV) of
a certain plaintiff litigating in a certain venue.
a) The Post-Barcelona.com World
Table A
R’s Alternatives in a Post-Barcelona.com World

Situation
TM
PJR
SMJ
Merits
UV
TUV
*

United States
I
II
+
–
0.5*(1)
0.5 (1)
1
1
0.5
1
2 (2.5)
2.5 (3)
4.5 (5 .5)

Jurisdiction X
III
IV
+
–
0.5 (1)
0.5 (1)
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.5 (2)
1.5 (2)
3 (4)

The value in parenthesis is the PJR value when plaintiff employs pre-litigation

strategies.

377

That is, the venue acknowledges and renders appropriate recourse in cases of
cybersquatting and/or RDNH claims.
378
The nature of the merits sought and its availability depends, naturally, on the
applicable law. The precise remedies available for the plaintiff in the various situations is
not a relevant parameter of the model and thus are not specified.
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Table B
MO’s Alternatives in a Post-Barcelona.com World

Situation
TM
PJR
SMJ
Merits
UV
TUV

United States
I
II
+
–
1
0.5
1
0
0.5
0
2.5
0.5
3

Jurisdiction X
III
IV
+
–
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.5
1.5
3

i. Explanation
In situation I in table A, R is filing a complaint in a U.S. court
under the RDNH provision of the ACPA after losing the
registration in the UDRP. Situation I also provides that the mark
in question is protected under the venue’s law, i.e., the Lanham
Act. Since foreign elements are involved, the model assumes that
MO would bring PJR challenge, and the chances of R’s success in
convincing a U.S. court to exercise PJR over MO are evaluated at
0.5. Further, since the RDNH provision of the ACPA renders a
certain SMJ in such a case,379 the value assigned in the relevant
field is 1. If R is successful in asserting personal and subject
matter jurisdiction in the United States, and given that the mark is
protected under the Lanham Act, R may or may not further succeed
in showing that the registration does not violate the ACPA, hence
the value 0.5 in the Merits field.
Situation II in table A differs from the previous scenario only
with respect to the validity of the mark under U.S. law. It provides
a scenario in which the mark is not protected under the Lanham
Act. In light of the outcome in the Barcelona.com, the value 1 is
assigned in the Merits field, and the probability for R to win in
court is very high.
On the other hand, consider situation III in table A. Success in
asserting PJR and SMJ in Jurisdiction X in a RDNH claim is

379

This example relies on a Sallen analysis.
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questionable, hence the value 0.5 is assigned.380 Even if R is
successful in both arguments, R may convince the court that the
registration is not unlawful, even though the mark is protected
under Jurisdiction X law. In situation IV in table A, where the
mark is not protected under Jurisdiction X law, the value 0.5 is still
assigned in the Merits field because the model cannot predict
whether the foreign court would resolve to grant cybersquatting
protection in an RDNH claim even to non-recognized marks.381
Finally, the values in parentheses assigned across the PJR fields of
table A indicate that R may also use litigation strategies in order to
increase its chances to establish personal jurisdiction over MO in
the chosen venue, as discussed in Part II.A.2 of this Article. Since
“locking” MO in a certain jurisdiction dramatically increases R’s
chances to establish PJR, the value 1 in parenthesis is assigned.
Table B presents the possible alternatives available for MO in a
post-Barcelona.com world.
In situation I, MO files a
cybersquatting action against R in a U.S. court, where the mark is
protected. MO has value 1 in the PJR field because the model
assumes that lack of personal jurisdiction over R does not bar a
cybersquatting action in the United States.382 MO has value 1 also
in the SMJ field383 and value 0.5 in the Merits field.384 In situation
380

Subject matter jurisdiction for losing registrants should not be taken for granted in
any given jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions may consider the UDRP as arbitration and
refuse to interfere (or, altogether refuse to acknowledge any cause of action providing
redress to R in such circumstances). For instance, in the United States it took the
legislation of the ACPA and the ruling of Sallen to establish such subject matter
jurisdiction. In addition, one U.S. appellate court has held that the UDRP is not a
proceeding falling under the Federal Arbitration Act. See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d
365, 371–73 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that the UDRP proceedings do not fall under the
Federal Arbitration Act, thus the court was not limited to that act’s constrains on UDRP
judicial review).
381
The Barcelona.com district court believed that the ACPA affords such protection.
See 189 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373–74 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d and vacated, 330 F.3d 617 (4th
Cir. 2002).
382
When personal jurisdiction in the United States cannot be ascertained, MO is likely
to invoke the in rem provision. See supra Parts II.B.2, IV.D (providing discussions on the
ACPA in rem provision and indicating that in rem jurisdiction is available when in
personam jurisdiction cannot be established). Since the gTLD registries, by and large,
are located in U.S. territory, MO using the in rem provision is very likely to succeed in
establishing basis for jurisdiction in the United States.
383
This is provided by the ACPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
384
The result depends of MO’s ability to establish its ACPA claims.

EFRONI FORMAT

2003]

12/9/2003 2:31 PM

BETTER MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN DISPUTES 107

II in table B, MO is likely to be required by a U.S. court to
establish personal jurisdiction over R, since the ACPA in rem
provision is not available when a foreign mark is involved, hence
the value 0.5.385 Further, the model assumes that the ACPA does
not protect non-U.S. marks, therefore the value 0 appears in the
SMJ field.386 Absent a U.S. recognized mark, and failing to
establish SMJ, MO has practically zero chance to win the merits of
a cybersquatting claim under the ACPA.387 Table B further
presents MO’s values in Jurisdiction X according to the same
principles.388 Tables A(a) and B(b) below presents the UV results
of Tables A and B, respectively.
Table A(a)
R’s UV in a Post-Barcelona.com World

United
States

+
–

Jurisdiction X
+
–
2 / 1.5
2 / 1.5
2.5 / 1.5
2.5 / 1.5

Table B(b)
MO’s UV in a Post-Barcelona.com World
Jurisdiction X
United
States

385

+
–

+
2.5 / 1.5
0.5 / 1.5

–
2.5 / 1.5
0.5 / 1.5

See supra note 235 (indicating that the in rem provision covers only U.S. protected
marks).
386
But see supra note 262 (discussing an alternative reading of the ACPA).
387
See id.
388
In situations III and IV in table B, territorial jurisdiction is always uncertain.
Further, MO is assigned the value 0.5 in the SMJ fields, since it is questionable whether
Jurisdiction X recognizes its cause of action absent of legislation similar to the ACPA
and/or other legal bases providing cybersquatting protection. In situation IV in table B,
MO holds no trademark rights under Jurisdiction X law. The model, however, cannot
predict whether Jurisdiction X affords cybersquatting protection even when the mark is
not recognized under its trademark system.
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ii. Analysis
The results unequivocally affirm the basic assumption of a
plaintiff-sensitive forum shopping situation. Table A shows that R
has a significant positive incentive (+1.5) to litigate in the United
States.389 In addition, table A(a) indicates that R has such
motivation regardless of the nature of trademark rights
involved.390 Table A further shows that R, implementing litigation
strategy, is increasing his TUV in both the United States and
Jurisdiction X.391
Table B shows that MO is technically indifferent between
litigating in the United States or in Jurisdiction X.392 A closer look
at table B(b), however, reveals that MO’s decision is highly
dependent on the “nationality” of the mark. Table B(b) shows that
MO is expected to favor the U.S. forum in two out of four possible
situations—only when a U.S. mark is involved. Hence, MO should
always favor a U.S. forum when it holds a U.S. mark.
Additionally the UV difference between situation I in table B
(having U.S. mark) and situation II in table B (having foreign
mark) is very significant.393
The conclusion derived from tables A and B is that Rs should
always favor bringing RDNH actions in U.S. courts,394 while MOs
should also favor the U.S. forum, but only when defending U.S.
marks.
Another interesting aspect of the model can be
demonstrated by combining the results of tables A(a) and B(b). It
appears that plaintiffs in general are expected to favor a U.S. forum
in six out of eight possible scenarios. Assuming that every
scenario has the same probability to occur, the model suggests that
plaintiffs are expected to favor litigation in the United States in

389

The total utility value (TUV) is 4.5 compared to only 3 in Jurisdiction X.
In all four possible alternatives R’s utility value (UV) is higher in the United States
than in Jurisdiction X.
391
The TUV is 5.5 in the United States, and 4 in Jurisdiction X, compared to 4.5 and 3,
respectively.
392
MO has TUV 3 in both venues.
393
In situation I in table B, the UV is 2.5. In situation II, the UV is only 0.5.
394
This assumes sterility of the scenario, namely that only the three arguments of
personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and merits are controlling R’s litigation
decision.
390
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approximately seventy-five percent of the cases.395 This finding
indicates that the ACPA has the potential of becoming a
“plaintiffs’ magnet” in cybersquatting disputes.396
b) The IACT World
Table C
R’s Alternatives in an IACT World

Situation
TM
PJR
SMJ
Merits
UV
TUV

United States
I
II
+
–
1
1
1
1
0.5
0.5
2.5
2.5
5

Jurisdiction X
III
IV
+
–
1
1
1
1
0.5
0.5
2.5
2.5
5

Table D
MO’s Alternatives in an IACT World

Situation
TM
PJR
SMJ
Merits
UV
TUV

United States
I
II
+
–
1
1
1
1
0.5
0.5
2.5
2.5
5

Jurisdiction X
III
IV
+
–
1
1
1
1
0.5
0.5
2.5
2.5
5

i. Explanation
Tables C and D present a reality possible in a world adhering to
the IACT regime. In table C, R files a RDNH action in either the
United States or Jurisdiction X and is likely to have in both
395

6 x 0.125 = 0.75.
This conclusion correlates with a previous finding indicating that the vast majority of
court-challenged UDRP decisions are litigated in the U.S. courts. See supra note 316 and
accompanying text. This correlation, however, does not necessarily suggest that the
situation described by the model is the only explanation for that finding.
396
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jurisdictions PJR and SMJ afforded by the IACT.397 Moreover, no
matter whether the mark in question is potentially protected in the
United States, in Jurisdiction X, in both, or in neither, R only may
succeed on the merits, therefore the value 0.5 assigned.398
Regarding the merits question, the adjudicating court’s
cybersquatting standard is generally applied,399 while the
substantive trademark laws applied in deciding whether the mark is
an IACT mark are U.S. law, Jurisdiction X law, or both.400 The
situation is essentially identical from MO’s perspective. It should
be able to assert personal and subject matter jurisdictions in
cybersquatting claims in any member state, and without regard to
whether the adjudicating member state substantively recognizes
the mark. MO’s success on the merits depends on showing that (1)
MO holds an IACT mark; (2) R does not hold an IACT mark; and
(3) registration is unlawful under the applicable cybersquatting
standard.
ii. Analysis
Tables C and D clearly present meaningful change of positions
of potential plaintiffs. Regardless of the nature of the trademark
rights involved and regardless of the venue adjudicating the
dispute, plaintiffs, both R and MO, have the same UVs and TUVs.
Namely, tables C and D show that plaintiffs, in any possible
scenario of cybersquatting disputes, are venue indifferent.
This result is achievable because the subject matter jurisdiction
and the personal jurisdiction problems are solved uniformly by the
IACT structure in a vast majority of possible situations. The IACT
system would have a substantial impact on several negative aspects
of the present scheme. First, an identical UV in all jurisdictions,
regardless of the nationality of the mark or the type of plaintiff, is
397

Subject matter jurisdiction is afforded by virtue of the anti-cybersquatting legislation
provided according to principle 1. In addition, R should not experience difficulties in
establishing personal jurisdiction, absent of bad faith situation, in accordance with
principle 10.
398
Compare this with situation II in tables A and B, where the merits values are 1 and 0,
respectively. See supra Part V.C.2 tbls. A, B.
399
The standard is generally applied in accordance with principle 3, but subject to the
choice of law principles.
400
The applicable trademark law depends on the nature of the trademark rights asserted
by MO.
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expected to discourage plaintiffs from attempting to direct the
dispute to the national courts most suitable for their needs.
Additionally, since the result in the various national courts depends
on similar considerations, the motivation to employ litigation
strategies by exploiting the ill-structured UDRP procedural rules
should disappear. Furthermore, the IACT scheme, through its
choice of law principles, decreases the potential benefits for
plaintiffs to forum shop under protective standards applied in
different member states.401
Second, the laundry machine effect402 in RDNH cases
involving foreign marks litigated in U.S. courts under the ACPA
disappears. Since under the IACT, U.S. courts must recognize and
enforce foreign trademarks that constitute IACT marks for the
limited purpose of preventing cybersquatting, owners of these
marks would no longer stand in U.S. courts without redress.
Clearly, in an IACT world no other member state would be
allowed to legislate a scheme that results in the laundry machine
effect of U.S. or foreign marks. In such a world, the concept of
fairness is better served, and national courts are expected to
experience less difficulty in consolidating international comity
principles and national cybersquatting schemes.
Third, owners of foreign marks are no longer endangering their
long-term interests by filing a UDRP (or any other similar policy)
complaint.
The partial reverse effect,403 contemplating the
apprehension of owners of foreign marks from filing UDRP
complaints in a post-Barcelona.com reality, is no longer a valid
concern. Absent of disfavoring treatment in U.S. courts, the
possible exercise of the ACPA’s RDNH provision is not
substantially different than a UDRP review in any other member
state’s national court.
Finally, the IACT system could help in preventing litigation
races. Such a phenomenon is a valid concern bearing some
consequences where different national legal schemes have possible
401

See supra text accompanying 253–54 (discussing principles 6 and 7).
See supra Part IV.D.4.
403
See supra Part IV.C.3 (describing a contemplated phenomenon of foreign owners
avoiding the UDRP and by doing so trying to avoid the long arm of the RDNH
provision).
402
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application on a single dispute. In this context, when comity
allows404 the first court where the case was bought to adjudicate
the dispute, parties are discouraged from turning to litigation
alternatives first.405 Moreover, the increase in certainty provided
by the IACT system regarding litigation outcomes should result in
a reduction of cybersquatting litigation volume in general, and
encourage parties to turn first to alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms.
It is important to note that an IACT scheme does not render the
UDRP meaningless or unnecessary. The UDRP may remain an
important mechanism providing a fast, cheap, and effective
solution in simple and straightforward cases of cybersquatting.
When disputes are no longer simple and straightforward, the IACT
scheme also may be considered as providing a legitimate appeal or
judicial review forum on UDRP decisions. Unlike the present
judicial review option, however, which is highly forum-sensitive,
applicable law-sensitive and subject to potential manipulations and
strategies, an IACT forum adjudication is none of the above.
Consequently, the UDRP may transform from a forum shopping
and RDNH engine into a component in a system that is designed,
inter alia, to thwart these problems.
Chicago-Kent Law Professor Graeme B. Dinwoodie concluded
that “[t]he rules that will control the allocation and use of domain
names . . . will inevitably (and perhaps appropriately) reflect laws
that are national, international, and supranational in nature. They
will be developed in quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial fora that
are national, international, and supranational in nature.”406
Concurring with this observation, it might be said that the IACT
scheme is making one step in this direction. The IACT represents
a solution that is no more than an essential combination of national

404

In this context, comity means in accordance with certain courts’ in rem jurisdiction
rules.
405
See supra Part IV.D.3 (discussing the “litigation race” as a consequence of the firstin-right rule as applied in GlobalSantaFe).
406
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain
Name System, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 495, 521 (2000).
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laws, an international treaty, and preliminary supranational
mechanisms in place.407
D. Why Should the IACT Be Attractive to Internet Nations?
1. Everyone Gets a Slice of the Pie
The analysis laid out in this Article suggests that an IACT
scheme has the potential of solving many of the present scheme’s
shortcomings. Realistically, it is important to consider whether the
IACT would provide an advantageous and attractive alternative to
any national player involved. The argument is that an IACT
structure should be, in many respects, attractive both to the United
States and to other foreign states. More specifically, foreign
countries’ incentive to join an IACT of which the United States is a
member state is clear; trademark rights protected under their laws
would no longer have high potential to receive disfavoring
treatment by a U.S. court deciding on cybersquatting disputes
under the ACPA. Owners of foreign marks would no longer be
“stripped” of their trademark rights in RDNH cases in U.S.
courts.408 Additionally, many of the concerns regarding the ACPA
in rem provision and its potential adverse effect on foreign
interests should diminish under an IACT structure.409
Consequently, some highly problematic countermeasures such as
the legislation of competing national anticybersqatting laws or the
creation of a competing DNS infrastructure altogether, would not
be necessary in this context.410

407

Dinwoodie asserted that “[t]he UDRP holds the promise of supranational laws and
supranational adjudication.” Id. at 511 (footnote omitted). In this respect, the UDRP (or
any other similar international dispute resolution mechanism concerning rights in domain
names) is the supranational aspect of the general IACT scheme, providing limited
solutions in limited types of fact patterns.
408
The city council argued in Barcelona.com that adjudicating the dispute only
according to U.S. law would strip a trademark owner of its foreign rights whenever it is
hauled into court by a U.S. domain name owner who has lost a UDRP administrative
proceeding. See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330
F.3d 617, 622–23 (4th Cir. 2003).
409
See discussion supra Parts II.B.2, IV.D.
410
See discussion supra Part IV.E (discussing some possible foreign reactions to U.S.
policy in regulating and adjudicating domain name registrations).
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On the other hand, the United States may also find the IACT to
be a better alternative. It would reduce the antagonism and
negative sentiments emerging in other countries toward its
rulemaking policy and courts.411 Additionally, preventing various
types of foreign reaction, motivated by those sentiments, would
also serve U.S. interests.412 Finally, the United States in particular
should benefit from the expected general reduction in the volume
of cybersquatting litigation. Such general reduction is likely to
ease the burden of caseload on U.S federal courts, especially the
ones in Virginia. Regarding disputes that nevertheless end up in
court, a more internationally oriented scheme, affording plaintiffs
with the opportunity to bring the dispute in any member state’s
court without risking their interests, would distribute adjudication
more proportionally between the jurisdictions involved.
2. IACT Critique
The IACT is, by no means, a perfect solution to international
domain name disputes. Some problematic aspects are yet to be
solved. For example, the minimum standard concept mandated by
principle 2 is expected to cause concerns among some potential
member states. Generally speaking, reaching an international
consensus regarding any kind of intellectual property standard of
protection has proven hard to achieve.413 Different counties have
different views about the nature and purpose of intellectual
property laws. In the case of trademarks, U.S. law is aimed at
protecting consumers against confusion and aggressively
protecting the proprietary interests of mark owners, driven by the
desire to encourage entrepreneurship, investments, and individual
efforts. On the other hand, in countries like Japan, intellectual
property policy is generally driven by commitments toward
collective benefits and progress of the nation as a whole.414
411

See Rains, supra note 335.
See supra Part V.A (analyzing the U.S. unilateral approach as a lose-lose situation).
413
See generally Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in
International Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 33 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 277 (2001) (investigating the global intellectual property rights
regime with a specific focus on the process of international consensus building).
414
Yonehara, supra note 331, at 213–14 (describing the policy rationales of Japanese
intellectual property laws).
412
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Different views about the role of trademark law created different
legal definitions of marks and dictated a different scope and type
of protection. Such differences may render an internationally
accepted minimum standard an evasive concept.415
Another thorny issue, relevant in any attempt to regulate
domain name registration, is the issue of well-known marks.416
The proposed IACT does not distinguish between marks on basis
of their strength. Principle 9 sets the first-in-time rule, providing
that when two IACT marks are competing on the same domain
name, the first mark owner to register wins. That means that
domain name registration of a lesser known mark recognized by
one of the member states would prevail over a claim of a wellknown mark regarding the registration as long as the lesser known
mark registered the domain name first. There is no easy solution
to this problem, especially since it goes down to the heart of the
controversy regarding the appropriate scope of trademark
protection, particularly in the context of the Internet, where domain
names are global and unique.417
415

A prominent attempt to reach internationally accepted standards on this issue was
made in WIPO’s 1999 report on Internet domain names. See WIPO FINAL REPORT, supra
note 355, ¶¶ 129–204. The enforcement of the WIPO recommendation (after some
revisions and modification), however, was effectuated by ICANN not by virtue of
international consensus, but because of ICANN’s control over the domain name system.
See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the adoption of the UDRP by ICANN and its imposition
through registration agreements on all gTLD registrations).
416
The Lanham Act terminology for a well-known mark is “famous mark.” See 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). Famous marks are protected against uses that “cause[]
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.” Id. Under the Lanham Act, dilution can
occur even when there is no likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. See id.
§ 1127 (defining “dilution”). The FTDA added to the Lanham Act a non-exhaustive list
of circumstances, helping courts to determine whether a mark in question is famous or
not. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(A)–(H). In international fora, article 16(2) of the TRIPS
Agreement, referring to article 6bis of the Paris Convention, mandates that “[i]n
determining whether a trademark is well-known, Members shall take account of the
knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in
the Member concerned which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the
trademark.” TRIPS, supra note 351, art. 16(2). Article 16(3) extends protection of wellknown marks also to use in “goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of
which a trademark is registered.” Id. art. 16(3).
417
The WIPO Final Report devoted a detailed and lengthy analysis to this problem. See
WIPO FINAL REPORT, supra note 355, ¶¶ 245–303. It suggested creating a priority
scheme that would favor well-known or famous marks in registration under some or all
the gTLDs. Id. ¶¶ 276–303. This recommendation, however, was not adopted by ICANN
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Despite these problems and perhaps some others that are not
discussed here, this Article argues that crafting an IACT, tailored
around the ten principles described above, is partially achievable.
There are three major reasons supporting this argument. First, the
IACT does not interfere with national substantive trademark
protection. In other words, a member state should be free to keep
its substantive trademark law framework unchanged—most
importantly, its definition and scope of marks eligible
protection.418 Next, a member state should not be required to
automatically grant full protection to marks that are protected by
other member states. Protection of non-recognized IACT marks
extends only to adjudication of domain name disputes, no more
and no less. A final reason supporting the IACT’s achievability is
that especially today, when the shortcomings of the present system
are no longer merely theoretical or academic but real and acute,
there is hope that Internet nations will show more flexibility and
motivation in bridging the controversies and crafting together a
new, better platform for international dispute resolution, at least in
the context of domain names.
CONCLUSION
The Barcelona.com decision is a correct application of a
problematic law. It contributes to the formulation of legal reality
in which U.S. federal courts, in some situations, constitute a
friendly forum to U.S. mark owners and potential cybersquatters of
foreign marks. At the same time, U.S. federal courts are becoming
hostile to owners of foreign marks trying to protect their marks
against cybersquatting under the ACPA RDNH provision. Such
reality is likely to bring about many worrisome developments in
the near future. On the individual, small-scale level, which may
evolve into a general trend, the possible result could be that parties
and thus, was not included in the UDRP. See Froomkin, supra note 69, at 632 (noting that
ICANN did not adopt WIPO’s proposal regarding a pre-emptive protection to famous or
well-known marks). In some gTLDs, however, ICANN implemented a “sunrise” policy,
which gave all trademark holders some sort of pre-emptive registration rights. Id. at 632
n.91.
418
Clearly, some trademark protection would be a prerequisite for joining the IACT
structure. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
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to international domain name disputes would direct litigation to the
forum that entertains their claims according to domestic, favorable
rules. Given the present physical structure of the Internet and the
structure of Internet-related rules, however, a large-scale reaction
of other Internet nations may bring about even more troubling and
radical results. The outcome in the Barcelona.com case underlines
the faults of a unilateral approach to domain name regulation and
adjudication. That approach has proven itself to be inadequate,
bearing myriad negative ramifications. At the same time, the
Barcelona.com decision reemphasizes the need for an international
collaboration in the battle against cybersquatting activities. The
proposal for the International Anticybersquatting Treaty represents
an alternative approach that should better serve the underlining
objective of fairly and adequately adjudicating international
cybersquatting disputes.

